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Most people who serve in the armed forces never qualify for military retirement
because only 1 8 percent of all personnel who enter active duty complete the 20 years of
service required for retirement eligibility. For the past five decades military personal
experts, service members, compensation policy specialists, legislators, and some Defense
Department officials have criticized the military retirement system for its generosity to a
small percentage of personnel at the expense of the majority of service members.
Numerous studies of the retirement system have generated many proposals for
reforming military retirement. However, a lack of consensus on what is the most
appropriate solution have stymied efforts for reform. In the last eleven years, marginal
changes have been implemented to reduce the cost of the system but structural reform has
not been attempted.
The Internal Revenue Code treatment of military retirement compounds the
unfairness inherent in the system itself. Civilian employers who provide a qualified
retirement plan for their employees can deduct any funds they contribute to the plan from
corporate earnings and employees do not have to pay taxes on the retirement benefits until
they actually receive them many years later. In the eyes of the IRS, a retirement system
such as this amounts to a tax-deferred retirement-savings plan for the recipient. Because a
covered employee receives one such opportunity through the employer's plan, the Internal
Revenue Code restricts his access to another form of tax-deferred retirement savings: the
Individual Retirement Account (IRAs). Workers with an employer-sponsored retirement
plan whose income exceeds certain thresholds can contribute to IRAs, but they cannot
deduct their contributions from current earnings. Workers not covered by an employer's
plan can deduct their contributions regardless of their income.
Federal law requires an employer-sponsored retirement plan to meet minimum
vesting, coverage, funding, and reporting criteria to qualify for favorable tax treatment.
Plans that meet the criteria get to defer taxes on the plan's assets, and the employees are
not automatically qualified to deduct their IRA contributions. Employees whose plans do
not meet the criteria, or who have no retirement plan at all, are eligible to deduct their IRA
contributions.
The IRS treats military retirement as if it were a qualified retirement plan under the
law, even though it does not meet the vesting, funding, and reporting criteria. In fact, the
feature of military retirement that is most frequently criticized as inequitable, the delay of
vesting until 20 years-of-service, is exactly what the law governing private-sector
retirement plans was designed to prevent. Thus, the majority of military personnel are
denied the opportunity for tax-deferred retirement saving available to all other American
citizens.
B. THE PROPOSAL
In this thesis, the author examines the issue of fairnes to service members and the
potential impact of ammending the Internal Revene Code to allow all military personnel to
deduct their contributions from taxable income, regardless of how much money they earn.
Doing so will mitigate the unfairness caused by treating service members as if they have a
retirement plan when in fact they are unlikely to receive any retirement benefits from the
military. This thesis examines the merits of the proposal.
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter II presents an overview of the military retirement system. It discusses the
origins, purpose and structure of the system. It describes the flaws of the system, reviews
past proposals for change, and details the reasons these proposals failed to materially
reform military retirement. Finally, it discusses some current proposals for reconfiguring
the system and details the legislative, bureaucratic, and political obstacles that make
systemic reform unlikely.
Chapter III describes Individual Retirement Accounts and reviews their legislative
history. It summarizes the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
that established the criteria that employer-sponsored retirement plans must meet to qualify
for tax-favored treatment, and points out how the military retirement system fails to meet
these criteria. It argues that military personnel should be allowed to deduct their IRA
contributions as a matter of equity.
Chapter IV reviews the economic literature on IRAs, focusing in particular on the
issue of whether IRAs effectively encourage people to save more money. It argues that
reducing the disincentive to saving caused by high marginal tax rates and taxation of
nominal gains effectively increases private saving rates. By reducing the disincentive to
save, ERA contribution deductibility will increase saving among service members.
Chapter V quantifies the cost of the proposal by estimating the annual personal
income tax revenue loss caused by extending ERA contribution deductibility to service
members who are now ineligible to do so. It also examines the long-term impact on total
tax revenues by examining the positive tax revenue effects of the withdrawal ofERA assets
during retirement, and increased corporate income tax revenues which are stimulated by
increased saving.
Chapter VI summarizes the author's findings and reviews the reasons why all
military personnel should be allowed to deduct their IRA contributions from taxable
income.
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n. OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter gives an overview of military retirement that will lay the foundation
for further evaluation of the equity of the system, and for discussion of a proposal for
change. This profile is not an all encompassing review of the entire system. Instead, it
examines some topics that are relevant to the issues addressed in subsequent chapters.
First the chapter describes the essential elements of the current system, such as the benefits
formulas, eligibility requirements, and budgeting and funding methods. Next it outlines
some of the historical developments that resulted in the current system. This historical
synopsis also lays the foundation for subsequent conclusions concerning the prospects for
changing the system. A discussion of the purpose of military retirement follows. This
section provides information necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the system as well
as the efficacy of proposals to change the system. A summary of the major plans for
change follows, and the chapter concludes with an evaluation of their chances for success
in the present environment.
B. SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
The Department of Defense (DoD) retirement program is a funded,
noncontributory, defined-benefit plan that includes nondisability retired pay, disability
retired pay, retired pay for reserve service, and survivor annuity. It provides an
immediate lifetime annuity with cost of living adjustments (COLA) to retiring service
members who have 20 or more years of service (YOS), regardless of age. Vesting, the
point at which service members become entitled to receive retirement benefits, occurs at
20 YOS. Eligibility, the point at which service members can claim and receive benefits
under the plan, occurs simultaneously. Service members who separate from the military
prior to 20 YOS receive no retirement benefits, regardless of whether their separation was
voluntary or involuntary. An exception to this policy is discussed in a subsequent section.
1. Benefits Formulas
Under a defined-benefits plan, an employer promises to provide an annuity of a
specified amount to the employee once he becomes eligible to receive it. The amount of a
military retiree's annuity is a function of his years of service and basic pay. Changes to the
benefit formula and cost of living adjustment in 1980 and 1986, affecting new entrants
only, resulted in three versions of nondisability retirement. These three versions, called
Final Pay, High-3, and REDUX, are described below.
a. Final Pay
The retirement annuity of personnel who first became members of the
Armed Services prior to 8 September, 1980 is computed as a percentage of final basic pay.
The formula for the annuity is (025*YOS*final basic pay.) The annuity is 50 percent of
final basic pay at 20 YOS and increases to a maximum of 75 percent of final basic pay for
30 YOS. The annuity is adjusted annually by the percentage change in the Consumer
Price Index. 1 This is known as full CPI protection. (DoD Actuary, 1996, p. 1
.)
b. High-3
The retirement annuity for personnel who first became members of the
Armed Services on or after 8 September 1980 is computed as a percentage of the annual
average of their highest three years of basic pay. This version is known as "High-3." The
formula for the annuity is (025*YOS* High-3 average basic pay.) The annuity is 50
percent of the average of the highest three years of basic pay at 20 YOS and increases to a
1 Annual CPI adjustments to retired pay are effective on 1 December of the fiscal year. As part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress voted to delay the effective date of the adjustments
for fiscal years 1994 to 1997. The effective date was delayed until March of the fiscal year for FY 1994,
1995, and 1996 The increase for FY 1997 is effective in September 1998.
maximum of 75 percent of this average for 30 YOS. High-3 also includes full CPI
protection of the annuity. This change to the benefit formula, included as part of the
Defense Authorization Act of 1981, was implemented to reduce the cost of the military
retired pay. (DoD, OSD, 1991, p. 460.)
c. REDUX
The REDUX version was adopted as part of the Military Retirement
Reform Act of 1986 and introduced a two-tier system to military retirement. The
retirement annuity for personnel who first became members of the Armed Services on or
after 1 August 1986 is also computed as a percentage of the annual average of their
highest three years of basic pay. The Act modified the formula to levy a penalty on
service members who retire prior to 30 YOS. Under the REDUX formula, retirees
receive 2 percent of their high-3 average basic pay for each year of service up to 20 years,
then receive 3.5 percent for each year thereafter, up to 30 YOS. The formula is
[4+.035*(YOS-20)]. Retirees receive 40 percent of their high-3 average basic pay at 20
YOS, increasing to 75 percent of this base at 30 YOS. The annuity is only partially
protected against inflation. The cost of living adjustment is reduced by one percentage
point below the percentage change in the CPI. (Asch and Warner, 1994a, p. 4.)
This system is two-tiered because it creates one level of benefits in the
second-career phase of military retirement and another level in the old age phase. The
penalty is in effect until the retiree reaches 62 years of age, at which point the penalty for
retiring prior to 30 YOS is eliminated and the annuity is recomputed as (025*YOS*High-
3 average basic pay.) There is also a one-time restoral of the COLA. The annuity is
indexed as if full CPI protection had been in effect over the intervening years, but after this
restoral, COLAs continue at the CPI minus one percentage point.
The purpose of this change was two-fold. First, it further reduced the cost
of retirement pay by lowering the annuity in the second-career phase. Second, it provided
a strong incentive for personnel to remain on active duty once they reach retirement
eligibility at 20 YOS. REDUX gives a greater marginal benefit for each additional year of
service past 20 because the amount of the annuity increases 40 percent more rapidly under
REDUX than under the High-3 or Final Pay formulas.
2. Temporary Voluntary Separations Programs
The post-Cold War drawdown led to an exception to the 20 YOS vesting and
eligibility rule. Congress authorized the Department of Defense to use two voluntary
separation programs in 1991 and a third program in 1993, to reduce the size of the active
duty force.
The Voluntary Separation Incentives (VSI) program allows the services to
provide an annuity to eligible service members who volunteer to leave active duty. The
VSI annuity is paid for twice the number of years of service completed by the member and
is a function of the final month of basic pay and years of service. The VSI annuity is
calculated by multiplying the final month of basic pay by the years of service times 2.5
percent. The Special Separations Benefit (SSB) provides a lump-sum payment to eligible
service members volunteering to leave active duty. The one-time payment is calculated as
15 percent of the final month of basic pay multiplied by 12, then multiplied by the years of
service. (GAO, 1996.)
Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) was granted as part of the
Defense Authorization Act of 1993. This authority gives the services the discretion to
retire personnel in certain occupational specialties provided they have at least 15 YOS.
Personnel who retire under TERA have their annuity reduced by 2.5 percent for each year
of service below 20 years. This reduction can be restored in whole or in part at age 62 if
the retiree works in a qualified public sector service job until the year when they would
have been eligible for normal retirement from active duty. The authority for all three
voluntary separations programs expires in 1999. (DoD Actuary, 1995.)
3. Military Retirement Fund
The Defense Authorization Act of 1984 significantly altered the method of funding
and budgeting for military retirement. It established the Department of Defense Military
Retirement Fund, changed the pay-as-you-go system to an accrual-based accounting and
budgeting system, and organized the DoD Board of Actuaries (GAO, 1997.) Prior to the
change, the annual obligation for current retiree annuities was funded from an annual DoD
appropriation. The Act required the Secretary of Defense to allocate a percentage of
annual military basic pay costs to the Fund to meet future retirement obligations for
current service members. This step brought DoD into compliance with provisions of the
Employee Income Retirement Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 which stipulate that pension
plans must be fully funded.
The switch to accrual accounting was significant for several reasons. The adoption
of accrual accounting introduced the concept of the normal cost (also known as the
retirement accrual charge) to the military retirement system. The normal cost is the level
percentage of pay that must be contributed throughout the employee's work tenure to
cover the cost of the lifetime pension benefits accrued to that point. The normal cost is
useful in evaluating the impact of retirement plan changes on costs and enables
comparisons of the cost of one pension plan to another.
Accrual accounting also recognized the liability to pay retirement to some
percentage of current service members as a future obligation and thus made the total cost
of current personnel decisions evident (DoD OSD, 1991.) It revealed the magnitude of
the unfunded liability for current retirees and service members who acceded prior to 1984.
Since normal cost contributions had not been made for current retirees and personnel with
service prior to 1984, an unfunded liability had accrued. This initial unfunded liability of
$528.7 billion was amortized over 60 years and is scheduled to be paid off by 2044.
In addition to placing the retirement system on sound actuarial footing, the
adoption of accrual accounting was also politically convenient. Under the pay-as-you-go
system, any changes to the annuity formula would not affect budget authority or outlays
for 20 years 2 Accrual-based accounting yielded an immediate payoff for changes.
Adoption of the accrual accounting system for military retired and retainer
pay in the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund made it
possible for Congress to reduce apparent Defense appropriations for the
current year without affecting the retired or retainer pay entitlements of any
current retiree or member of the armed forces... Given the imperatives to
reduce the Federal budget deficit in general and Department of Defense
appropriations in particular, Congress achieved such reduction by the
relatively painless expedient of changing the military retirement system in a
way that would affect only persons who first became members of the
uniformed service on or after August 1, 1986. (DoD OSD, 1991.)
By immediately recognizing changes in the future liability of retirement obligations,
accrual accounting allowed Congress to reap the benefits of annuity reductions in the near
term, without angering any current service members or retirees.
All disbursements to retirees come from the Military Retirement Fund. As of 30
September 1995, the Fund paid $2.14 billion in monthly nondisability retirement payments.
The fund in turn receives money from three sources: annual normal cost payments from
the Military Personnel Appropriation, transfers from the Treasury to amortize the
unfunded liability, and interest payments on treasury securities held by the Fund. The
DoD Board of Actuaries makes the calculations necessary to forecast the future liability of
military retirement based on actuarial assumptions concerning inflation, wage growth,
accessions, retention, retirement, and mortality.
Another benefit of the Fund comes from the additional security it provides service
members and retirees. The existence of the fund alone furnishes near-term security, since
benefits for the year can be paid regardless of whether Congress passes an appropriation
2 Congress has been unwilling to make any retroactive change to the system which would affect retirees or
current service members. In the face of stiff opposition by DoD and retirees, Congress has instead taken
the easier route of changing the system for new joins only.
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bill. The fact that costs are fully recognized in advance confers a certain amount of long-
term security as well. (DoD Actuary, 1995.)
C. ABRIDGED HISTORY OF MILITARY RETIREMENT
A brief review of the evolution of the military retirement system is useful because it
furnishes a context for subsequent discussion of the purpose of military retirement, as well
as the description of proposed changes and evaluation of their chances for success.
The basic arrangement of a nondisability retirement system that includes voluntary
and involuntary separation after a given career length was established in 1861. A series of
legislation in the late 1940s, including the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and the Army and
Air Force Vitalization Act of 1948 codified a common retirement system for all the
services and brought treatment of officers and enlisted personnel close to equality. The
legislation established the eligibility for retirement annuities at 20 YOS, the unqualified
right to retire at 30 YOS, and severance pay for involuntary separations. This system,
which came under immediate scrutiny and criticism, was evaluated by ten major reviews
and blue ribbon commissions over the next 40 years.
In 1948, both the Joint Army-Navy Pay Board and the Advisory Commission on
Service Pay (also known as the Hook Commission) examined the system and offered
conflicting proposals for change. Their proposals for change differed on whether the
vesting and eligibility dates should be changed, whether the annuity should be immediate
or deferred, and whether the system should be contributory or noncontributory. Congress
adopted many of the Hook Commission's recommendations on active pay, but did not
adopt any of the proposed changes to the retirement system.
The 1 st Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) was convened in
1969. It recommended a two-tier system composed of a small annuity upon retirement
from the armed forces to compensate for the second-career income loss, and an old-age
annuity beginning at age 62. Both annuities were to be computed as a percentage of final
salary based on years of service.
11
The Interagency Committee on Uniformed Services Retirement and Survivor
Benefits (IAC) was appointed in 1971 by President Nixon to review the recommendations
of the 1 st QRMC and further evaluate the retirement system. The IAC also proposed a
two-tiered system but recommended vesting in an old-age annuity between 10 and 19
years of service. After some modifications to the proposals of both the 1st QRMC and the
IAC, the Retirement Modification Act was submitted to Congress in 1974. Congress
failed to pass the legislation. Instead it directed DoD to charter the Defense Manpower
Commission (DMC) in 1976 to conduct additional studies.
The DMC reviewed many aspects of personnel and compensation policy. It too
offered some proposals on reforming military retirement, including vesting in an old-age
annuity at 10 YOS, and allowing members in occupational specialties requiring youth and
vigor, particularly the combat arms to retire with 20 YOS while requiring noncombat
specialties to reach 30 YOS for retirement. The DMC recommendations were not
presented as legislation.
President Carter established the President's Commission on Military Compensation
(PCMC) in 1977. It also recommended vesting in an old-age annuity at 10 YOS, with the
date of eligibility for the annuity varying by length of service. Personnel with more years
of service would be eligible to receive the annuity at an earlier age. It also recommended
the establishment of a transition trust fund for each member, to which DoD would
contribute graduated amounts according to basic pay and length of service. Upon
separation, the service member could receive a lump-sum payment from the trust, take the
funds in monthly installments, or roll the funds into another retirement account. After
some modifications, DoD submitted the proposals of the PCMC to Congress as the
Uniformed Services Retirement Benefit Act in 1979. It was never enacted. (Asch and
Warner, 1994b.)
The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1980 implemented the first major
change to retirement benefits since the late 1940s by changing the base for retirement
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annuity computation from final basic pay to the annual average of the highest 36 months
of basic pay. Program cost reduction motivated this change.
The 5th QRMC met in 1983 and proposed a range of alternatives, including a two-
tiered system with a reduced annuity in the second-career phase of military retirement. It
disagreed with earlier proposals to vest prior to 20 YOS, and characterized the existing
benefits for 20-year retirees as excessive. While the 5th QRMC was conducting its
discussions of military compensation, President Reagan commissioned the President's
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (PPSS), better known as the Grace Commission, in
1984. The study's mandate was to find ways to reduce costs and inefficiencies in the
federal government. The Grace Commission also recommended vesting in an old-age
annuity at ten years of service, reducing annuities for 20-year retirees prior to age 62,
offsetting retirement pay by the amount of Social Security income, reducing COLAs, and
computing annuities using a less generous benefits formula. The Grace Commission's
recommendations were reviewed by the General Accounting Office, the Congressional
Budget Office, and the 5th QRMC. All three criticized them for focusing too narrowly on
cost reductions without considering the impact of their recommendations on retention and
force structure. (Pyle, 1995.)
The 5th QRMC submitted its own report in 1984, and after some modifications,
DoD presented its recommendations as legislation to Congress in 1985. The Military
Retirement Reform Act, which enacted the REDUX version of military retirement,
implemented some of the recommendations of earlier reviews, such as a two-tiered system
and overall reduction of benefits, but it stopped short of providing any benefits to those
who separate prior to 20 YOS. (Asch and Warner, 1994b.) The military retirement
system has remained virtually untouched since the enactment ofREDUX.
D. PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Describing the purpose of the military retirement system performs several
functions. First, after examining the historical context of the system, the description of
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purpose sheds light on why changes to the system were infrequent and marginal in nature.
Second, it provides a means to evaluate the efficacy and prospects for success of current
proposals to modify the retirement system. Third, it highlights the need for change to
correct some of the deficiencies of the system.
The DoD Actuary lists the following goals for the military retirement system (DoD
Actuary, 1995, p. B-2):
•
•
Ensuring that continued service in the armed forces is competitive with the
alternatives.
Keeping promotion opportunities open for young and able members.
Making some measure of economic security available after retirement from a
military career.
Maintaining a pool of experienced personnel for recall in times ofwar or
national emergency.
• Keeping the costs of the system affordable.
1. Uniqueness of the Military Structure
The purpose of military retirement differs from the purpose of civilian sector
retirement plans because of the military's lateral entry constraint. Most civilian-sector
firms can hire personnel into any level of employment from entry level to senior
management, and they are not concerned with generating turnover among senior
employees to provide advancement opportunities for junior personnel. Civilian retirement
plans function primarily as a tax-deferred method for transferring consumption from the
present to the future, and are not consciously designed to affect the composition of the
work force. 3
* The structure of private sector pension plans affects retirement timing decisions and influences the
structure of the work force. However, penalties imposed on early departures and late retirements are fairly
homogenous across all firms, and appear to have little correlation with the type of work force these firms
require. This suggests that firms are not using pension plans to shape the work force to their particular
needs, but are integrating them with Social Security to simplify their plans and employee retirement
decisions. Under these circumstances, it is evident that private sector pension plans function primarily as
tax-deferred savings tools rather than work force-management tools. (Ippolito, 19XX, p. 144-148.)
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The military's hierarchical structure, culture, and unique training requirements
constitute a lateral entry constraint. The armed services cannot hire personnel from
outside the organization to command ships, battalions, and squadrons, or fill other top-
level billets. Since the military cannot hire personnel from outside the organization to fill
vacancies above entry level, "it must access and train large numbers of entrants before
identifying for advancement those who have the talent to perform the higher level tasks in
the organization" (Asch and Warner, 1994a, p. 20.)
2. Retirement as a Force-Management Tool
The principal purpose of the military retirement system has been a topic of
discussion since the Joint Army-Navy Pay Board and the Hook Commission reviewed the
current system at its genesis. The 1st, 5th, and 7th QRMCs have also dedicated significant
intellectual capital to consideration of the issue. While there is some debate on the
importance and legitimacy of secondary purposes, there is a consensus that military
retirement functions first and foremost as a force-management tool. Force management is
the method by which DoD achieves an active duty and reserve personnel structure with
the desired distribution of ranks, ages, experience levels, and occupational specialties. The
retirement plan aids force management in several ways.
a. Ability Sorting and Self-Sorting
Ability sorting is the function of the system that segregates the personnel
who have the capability and skills to perform at the higher levels of the organization from
those who do not. Military personnel policy achieves ability sorting through minimum
performance standards, promotion "contests," and up-or-out rules that require the
involuntary separation of personnel who reach established year-of-service limits without
progressing to the next rank4 .
4 This is called "High Year of Tenure.'
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Self-sorting describes the capability of the system to induce members to
make this segregation on their own. The 20-year vesting provision provides the self-
sorting mechanism. The reward of military retirement is significant and attractive, but it is
available only to those who can complete at least 20 years of service. Thus the expected
payoff varies among individuals according to their probability of advancing sufficiently in
rank to reach 20 years of service. To receive the annuity, service members must progress
through a series of promotion contests and avoid the up-or-out provisions that will
separate them involuntarily prior to 20 YOS should they fail to progress in rank. Those
service members who believe they have the ability to succeed and get promoted will try to
do so because their expected payoff for retirement is high. Service members who realize
they are unsuitable for higher level positions and are thus unlikely to be promoted will
have a much lower expected payoff for retirement. Thus, the system will encourage them
to leave early on before they invest much time. (Asch and Warner, 1994b.)
b. Effort Motivation
The military retirement system also aids force management by incentivizing
hard work among its members. People respond to incentives. The military pay structure
encourages hard work by providing increased pay for promotions. As long as hard work
increases the probability for promotion, the pay raises will encourage people to increase
effort. But as personnel progress in rank, two factors reduce the incentive for effort.
First, because the number of remaining promotions is reduced, the total remaining
expected payoff from increased effort is lower. Second, because the less able have been
eliminated in previous promotion selections, the remaining pool of personnel is more
homogenous, making it difficult for personnel to distinguish themselves. This decreases
the probability that hard work will improve the chances for promotion because there are
fewer people remaining to pass, and passing is harder to do. Decreasing payoff and
decreasing probability reduce the incentive to work harder. To maintain incentives for
hard work at higher ranks, the pay chart must be skewed to provide a continuing reward
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to effort. In other words, the additional pay from promotion should grow at an increasing
rate as rank progresses. The active duty pay chart is only moderately skewed towards
higher ranks and does not sufficiently offset the decrease in incentives for hard work
described above. (Asch and Warner, 1994a.)
The retirement annuity provides skewness to the higher ranks because only
personnel reaching the superior ranks can attain sufficient time in service to receive the
annuity. And since the retirement annuity is based on the final years of pay, any additional
pay increase resulting from promotion will increase the size of the annuity. The additional
skewness added by the retirement annuity provides significant incentive for personnel to
work hard as they progress in rank. (Asch and Warner, 1994a.)
c. Separation Incentive
An important function of military retirement is the incentive it gives
personnel to separate once they reach the eligibility point. The Hook Commission
recognized the importance of this function in its 1948 report.
[A] sound retirement system is essential to solving the superannuation
problem. The services must be kept young, vigorous, and efficient; a
sound retirement plan with a proper compulsory retirement age will permit
youth and brains to rise to the top in time to be effective.
The importance of solving the superannuation problem (service members
growing too old to perform their functions) was demonstrated in the Civil War and World
War I, when many of the officers filling command billets were too decrepit to deploy to
the field with their units and young officers exercised responsibility far exceeding their
rank (DoD OSD, 1991.) The military needs personnel who possess youth and vigor,
particularly in the combat arms, and an older force is less likely to meet the extraordinary
physical performance standards the military requires.
The immediate annuity upon retirement, regardless of age, is a unique
feature of military retirement. Most civilian sector pension plans require employees to
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reach normal retirement age (usually between 62-65) to be eligible for an unreduced
retirement annuity. However most civilian employers do not require youth and vigor of
their employees, nor are they necessarily concerned about providing opportunities for
advancement for younger personnel.
The military must sustain sufficient turnover in the upper ranks to prevent
stagnation of personnel in the middle ones. If the chances for promotion are slim, and the
wait between promotions is long, retention will suffer. The rigors of combat demand that
military personnel meet high standards of physical fitness. These factors require that
personnel be separated from the military at some point, regardless of their individual
productivity.
Because retirees can receive an immediate annuity upon separation from
active duty, the gain to staying and the loss of leaving are significantly reduced. This is
particularly important for the military since there is a well-documented income loss during
second careers for military personnel. The soldier in his middle forties who has spent a
career in one of the combat arms may find himself ill-prepared for civilian employment.
Aging personnel with military-specific skills face a loss of income when transitioning to
the private sector. Given the opportunity to do so and absent other incentives, many
would choose to stay on active duty past their prime to maximize their income. Without
some incentive to separate, service members in this position will tend to remain on active
duty until they are forced to leave.
This brings up a common criticism of the generosity of military retirement.
Critics ask why DoD must pay people to leave active duty when they could separate them
involuntarily. Certainly, involuntary separation can be used to prevent superannuation, or
to otherwise reduce end strength. However, reliance on this mechanism has a negative
effect on morale, and may impact adversely on the retention of younger service members.
It might also require the payment of a "regret premium" to compensate service members
forced to leave active duty (Asch and Warner, 1994a, p. 22.) If these disaffected service
members lobby lawmakers to change the policy or make exceptions, the force structure
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that might be forced on DoD could reduce productivity and increase costs. Although their
magnitude is difficult to estimate accurately, when these costs are considered, it may be
less expensive to give incentives for voluntary separation. (Asch and Warner, 1994b.)
The structure of the benefits formula, which increases the annuity as a
percentage of basic pay from 20 to 30 YOS, pushes many people to leave once reaching
initial eligibility, encourages some of the most able (or at least most likely to be promoted
to the highest ranks) to remain longer, then provides a powerful incentive to separate at 30
YOS by capping benefit accrual at that point.
Military retirement thus produces sufficient incentives for separation
without resorting to involuntary methods. Asch and Warner note that "separation pay is
the elixir that eases termination from the organization and weakens potential criticism
about the capriciousness or arbitrariness of the system." They also point out that inducing
voluntary separation at the proper point and thus avoiding the negative effects of
involuntary separation is the distinct function of the military retirement since the other
functions, ability sorting, effort motivation, and retention, could all be achieved through
other methods. (Asch and Warner, 1994b.)
3. Rewarding for the Hardships of Military Life
Many retirees believe that military retirement is a reward for enduring the
hardships and deprivations that go along with service in the armed forces. This belief
incites vigorous and angry protests at the very mention of reducing benefits or otherwise
modifying the system. Although the argument is compelling, it is fundamentally flawed,
and the 1st QRMC rejected it in 1969. The Commission astutely pointed out that if
retirement was the reward for enduring hardships, then the system was grossly inequitable
because only personnel who made it to retirement received this reward. Personnel who
served for less than 20 years, particularly those that were drafted and served during times
of war, also endured great hardships, but received no such reward because they did not
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retire from active duty. Presented in this way, it is clear that military retirement does not
function as a reward for the hardships of service.
4. Compensation for Second-Career Income Loss
Personnel retiring after 20+ YOS typically have fewer opportunities in the private
sector than personnel who left the military earlier, or who never served in the armed
forces. Personnel who separate after long military careers typically don't possess the skills
civilian employers want. The age and higher expectations for status make senior service
members unsuitable for the majority of entry-level positions. For these reasons, many
retired service members earn smaller incomes than their non-military counterparts during
their second-career phase. Some personnel earn incomes lower than their active duty pay.
This phenomenon is called the second-career income loss. Several studies estimate that
military personnel earn incomes which are 25 to 30 percent lower than their peers who
never served in the military (Asch and Warner, 1994b.)
Military retirement must compensate for this earnings loss to induce personnel to
take the time and effort to acquire military specific skills that will be of no use in civilian
employment. Additionally, the more unique to the military a particular skill is, the less
transferable those skills will be and, thus, the greater the income loss incurred. Under
these circumstances, personnel in the most military-specific specialties such as the combat
arms (infantry, artillery, armor) will suffer a greater second-career income loss and will be
less willing to leave the armed forces. However, the personnel in these occupational
specialties are the ones that DoD must encourage to leave early because of the
pronounced requirements for youth and vigor the combat arms demand.
In compensating for the second-career income loss, military retirement equitably
treats service members who stay on and acquire military specific skills while
simultaneously offering the separation incentive necessary for sound force management.
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5. Transferring Current Consumption to Future Consumption
Providing economic security after retirement from a military career is one of the
purposes listed by the DoD Actuary in its description of the retirement system. Clearly,
military pensions do provide a measure of security for military retirees, but this role is not
the principal purpose of the system. In its discussion on this issue the Hook Commission
made this point.
Other concepts of fair treatment and the traditional concepts of retirement
for those taking up the profession of arms are also important and have been
given consideration but the Commission does not consider them to be
controlling. (Asch and Warner, 1994a, p. 22.)
In a macro perspective, the military retirement system does transfer current
consumption to future consumption. The Department of Defense has a finite budget, and it
funds both active pay and the annual normal cost payments to the Military Retirement
Fund from the Military Personnel appropriation. Thus, each dollar transferred to the fund
for retired pay is unavailable for active compensation. In this sense, military pensions
transfer current consumption to future consumption. In the micro perspective, this
transfer of resources is inefficient and unjust. All personnel forgo current consumption to
fund military retirement, since active pay is reduced for all personnel, regardless of
whether they retire. However, only 17 percent of military personnel receive a retirement
annuity, so, for the large majority, their sacrifice of current consumption yields no future
benefit. If providing future economic security for military personnel is a function of the
military retirement system, then it needs some sort of reform because it does it so poorly.
6. Summary of Purpose
The purpose of the military retirement system is complicated and involves many
issues. The fairness, affordability, and effectiveness of the systems are key topics of
discussion. Measures of effectiveness usually concentrate on how well the system fulfills
its many stated purposes such as providing economic security in retirement, offsetting the
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second-career income loss, and facilitating force management. The military compensation
system, of which retirement is a component, must be fair to all members, and it should
provide some degree of economic security in retirement to personnel, regardless of
whether they reach the armed forces' delayed vesting point. Each member of the
uniformed services should have the same rights as civilians to save for retirement.
However, changes to the system which are designed to make it more equitable to all
members are acceptable only if they do not have an adverse impact on force management.
The discussion and analysis that conclude this chapter are based on the belief that while all
of the purposes are valid, military retirement is principally a force-management tool, and
that any proposal to modify the system must be evaluated according to how it affects this
function.
E. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGING MILITARY RETIREMENT
This section reviews some of the proposals for changing the military retirement
system. Discussing these proposals accomplishes two functions. First, it shows that the
belief that the system is in some way flawed and in need of reform is widely held. Second,
it illustrates the fractious nature of the debate and highlights the lack of unity among those
who advocate reform. The author contends that the variety of opinion on how to reform
military retirement, combined with reasoned DoD opposition to change, significantly
decreases the probability that any type of change will occur.
Several components of the retirement system could be altered. The method and
the degree to which any element or group of elements would be changed ranges from
marginal reform to structural overhaul. These areas are listed below.
• The type of system: defined benefits or defined contributions.
• The benefit accrual formula used to compute the annuity amount.
• The formula and frequency of cost of living adjustments.
• The amount of employee contributions, government matching, and plan
investment options in defined contribution plans.
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• The eligibility point: immediate versus deferred annuity.
• The vesting point.
The proposals discussed below use changes to one or more of these areas to
accomplish their proponents' vision for reform.
1. Earlier Vesting
There have been a number of recommendations to vest military personnel in the
retirement system earlier in their careers. Many propose vesting members in an old-age
annuity at some point after 10 YOS. The advocated vesting point varies from 10 to 15
years of service. Eligibility varies from age 55 to 62, usually depending on how long the
member served. Some of these proposals include cost-of-living adjustments while others
do not. In these versions, personnel who reach the vesting point but separate prior to 20
YOS would be eligible to receive an annuity once they reached normal retirement age. A
recent report by the General Accounting Office included a proposal for 10-year vesting in
an old-age annuity based on years of service, transitioning to an immediate annuity with 20
YOS (GAO, 1997.) Some of these recommendations for earlier vesting in an old-age
annuity would extend the eligibility date for an immediate annuity to 30 years.
Asch and Warner refer to this class of proposals as "Band-Aid Vesting." They
predict that these changes would have little impact on accessions, retention, ability sorting,
and effort motivation because of the low net present value of the deferred annuity. Their
analysis examined the impact of a plan with 10 year vesting in an old-age annuity
commencing at age 62. They predict that this change would increase the DoD normal
cost by 3.1 percent and add $582 million annually to military personnel costs. (Asch and
Warner, 1994a.)
Another proffered change to vesting provisions includes an immediate annuity at
15 YOS. The RAND analysis predicts a small impact on force structure from this plan,
but predicts that normal costs would increase by 3 percent to 10 percent, depending on
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whether the annuity was computed using the REDUX or High-3 formula. Asch and
Warner contend that a similar impact on force structure could be achieved at much lower
cost by changing the active duty pay scale. (Asch and Warner, 1994a.)
The chief obstacle to earlier vesting in either an immediate or deferred annuity is
the effect it has on force structure. Earlier vesting allows personnel to reach retirement
eligibility at fewer years of service and lower ranks. This will encourage some personnel
to remain on active duty despite low prospects for advancement because it will be easier
for them to meet the lower eligibility requirements for retirement benefits. It also reduces
effort incentives because personnel need not attain as high a rank to qualify for retirement.
Any proposal that includes earlier vesting must find ways to mitigate these reductions in
incentives for ability sorting and effort motivation. Without delayed vesting, the military
may have difficulty encouraging those with potential for top leadership to seek
advancement and to discourage from lingering those whose aptitude for military service
limits them to an initial term.
2. Thrift Savings and 401(k) Plans for the Military
Salary deferral plans like the Thrift Savings Plan portion of the Federal Employee
Retirement System and the popular 401(k)s used by many civilian employers are touted as
a way to give all service members greater economic security in retirement, as well as a
method for stimulating savings. These plans allow participants to set aside pre-tax income
subject to certain limits. Taxes on contributions, interest, dividends, and capital gains are
deferred until the money is withdrawn. Some recommendations for a military version
include government matching of employee contributions, others do not. One imaginative
approach suggests gradually increasing the amount of government matching as personnel
gain seniority then tapering it off towards the end of a career as a way to induce effort and
ability sorting at the early and mid-career point, while still providing a separation incentive
to senior personnel.
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The Armed Forces Tax Council is currently drafting a proposal to allow pre-
retirement eligible members to contribute up to 5 percent of their basic pay, with no
government matching, to a thrift savings program. There is no legislation pending, and the
proposal is meeting some opposition from within DoD over concerns of "putting
retirement on the table."
Because 401(k)s and Thrift Savings Plans set aside contributions prior to taxes,
this plan would reduce government revenues at least in the short run. Any level of
government matching of contributions would also increase the defense budget.
3. The RAND Proposal
Asch and Warner proposed a method which they believe would reduce the inequity
of delayed vesting, maintain constant the overall effort motivation and ability sorting
incentives of the compensation system, and reduce costs for DoD. They recommend
vesting personnel with ten years of service in an old-age annuity that commences at age
60. To compensate for the second-career income loss and to induce separations at the
proper point, they recommend severance pay for all personnel who are detached
voluntarily or involuntarily. The amount of the severance payment would the product of
the member's final basic pay, years of service, and a separations payment multiplier.
According to their model, maintaining retention, effort and ability sorting constant would
require an increase in active pay if the separations pay multiplier was set at 10 percent. 5
The authors calculated that no increase of active pay would be required to maintain
current incentives if the multiplier was set at 25 percent. They also predict that this plan
could save $600 million and reduce the normal cost by 10 percent annually. (Asch and
Warner, 1994a.)
5 Currently, personnel who are involuntary separated between 10 and 19 years of service receive
severance pay of 10 percent of the final annual basic pay times the number of years of service.
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4. Structural Reform
Certain proponents of change advocate more drastic structural reform. Some have
advocated eliminating military retirement altogether, using active pay only to manage the
force structure. The necessary role of retirement as a separations incentive, and the
distaste Congress and DoD seem to have for extreme changes, condemn this type of
radical proposal to failure.
Another proposal for significant change is to scrap the current system and replace
it with one that resembles the Federal Employee Retirement System. Such a system would
provide a basic old-age pension for all employees, allow contributions into a thrift savings
plan with government matching, and integrate benefits from Social Security. The
advantage of this plan is that a system is already in place to administer it, reducing the
burden of implementing such a system for military personnel. The disadvantage is that it
does not take into account the peculiar requirements of the military and its lateral entry
constraint.
One class of proposals would allow DoD to vary the vesting point, eligibility point,
and benefit formulas by officer/enlisted category, military occupational specialty, and
service as a way to improve the flexibility of force management. The benefit of such a
proposal is it would allow DoD to fine tune retirement's effect on force structure. The
disadvantage is that it abandons DoD's cultural dedication to the principal of horizontal
equity in pay, as well as its traditionally open and clearly understood pay scale. Basic pay
rates, longevity increases, and retirement eligibility are uniform throughout DoD because
military compensation, based on the principle of comparability, recognizes that all
members are legally liable to armed conflict and any specialization is secondary to this fact
(OSD, 1996).
5. The Atmosphere for Change
The prospects for changing the military retirement system have never been good.
The system has been remarkably stable since its genesis after the Civil War, and the major
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changes, most of which were marginal in nature, have occurred decades apart. Once the
legislation in the 1940s cleared up the discrepancies between the services, military
retirement remained virtually unchanged until 1980. The emphasis of the most recent
changes in 1980 and 1986 was on reducing costs and increasing the force management
flexibility, in that order. The authors believes four factors ~ cost concerns, DoD
reluctance, Congressional unwillingness, and the complexity of evaluating the impact on
force structure ~ decrease the likelihood of any fundamental change to military retirement.
Concerns over the cost of the system not only work against proposals that would
expand benefits, but also discourage benefit reduction proposals. The federal budget has
been tight for three decades. The main focus of this year's budget debates has been on
finding sources of budget savings to finance tax cuts and deficit reduction. In an
atmosphere where defense budgets have been declining in real terms for years, any
proposal that increases the cost of the retirement system is dead on arrival. The peculiar
nature of the funding structure for retirement also discourages changes that reduce
benefits. DoD believes it is unfair and dishonest to change the terms of retirement
compensation for an individual after that person joins the armed forces. This belief is
known as the implicit promise, and DoD's strident and successful defense of it means that
changes to the system are almost always grandfathered so that they only affect new joins.
The Military Retirement Fund's use of accrual accounting captures any such savings as
reduction to the future liability of the retirement system, which shows up as a reduction in
Defense budget authority. However, there is no immediate impact on net outlays. Benefit
reduction proposals will usually be met with resistance from DoD, and in light of the small
immediate payoff, Congress is less willing to fight against a well-organized defense.
Congress itself expressed resistance to dramatic change when it passed the Military
Retirement Reform Act of 1986. The conference committee which finalized the legislation
that gave us REDUX said it hoped that its moderate changes would "put the issue of
structural reform of the uniformed services retirement system to rest for the foreseeable
future" (DoD OSD, 1991, p. 462). The historical review at the beginning of the chapter
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also demonstrates that Congressional gridlock and bureaucratic inertia are significant
obstacles to change. There was no shortage of commissions, studies, or proposals, but
Congressional enactment of recommendations occurred infrequently.
The Department of Defense is wary of changes for several reasons of its own.
With respect to cost concerns, the department knows that many in Congress see the
Defense budget as a source of savings or funds for other programs. They are hesitant to
consider proposals because they fear that what goes into Congress as a change to improve
benefits or increase flexibility may come out as a cut in retirement funding. DoD is also
loathe to violate its implicit promise to retirees or current service members by considering
retroactive changes to benefits formulas or COLAs, and has vigorously opposed past
efforts to make retroactive changes (GAO, 1997). 6
DoD's resistance to modifying military retirement in the near future is summed up
in the response from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy to
the GAO report on possible changes to the retirement system. The response listed the
following concerns on the specific proposals listed in the GAO report, and on change in
general: (GAO, 1997,p 52.)
• The current system should be allowed to stabilize and the impact of the 1980
and 1986 changes should be evaluated before further changes are enacted.
• The current system effectively provides the force the nation needs.
• Costs are already declining due to the reduction of benefits and the declining
force size.
• DoD must honor the implicit promise to retirees and current service members.
Any change which reduces their benefits would be a breach of faith and would
have a negative impact on morale and the credibility of the Department of
Defense as an employer.
6 An element of the FY96 budget would have recomputed the retirement annuity for all service members
and retirees who became members of the armed forces before 8 September 1980. The change, called
High-1, would have changed the annuity from a percentage of final basic pay to a percentage of the
average of the highest 12 months of service. Intended as a cost cutting measure, the idea ran into such a
buzz saw of opposition from DoD and retirees that it was quickly dropped from the budget.
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••
The immediate annuity is an essential feature and must be maintained as part of
the system.
Varying the system by service, military occupational specialty, and
officer/enlisted status would be unfair and needlessly complicate the system.
Adoption of system like the Federal Employee Retirement System or the early
vesting in an old-age annuity is opposed because of the unknown impact on
retention.
A final factor that makes change to the retirement system in the near future
unlikely is the fact that any proposal must be evaluated with respect to the principal
purpose of the military retirement system: force management. The complexity and
contentiousness of evaluating the impact of changes on force structure make this task
daunting. Recent experience with the Quadrennial Defense Review and the fate of
proposals for another two rounds of Base Realignment and Closure demonstrate that
neither DoD nor Congress has much stomach for dramatic or possibly painful changes to
the status quo. The combination of these four factors — cost concerns, DoD hesitancy,
Congressional unwillingness, and the complexity of evaluating the impact on force
structure ~ make the probability for change near zero.
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m. IRAS, ERISA, AND EQUITY
A. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code provides tax benefits for employers who furnish, and
employees who participate in a qualified pension plan, but the plans must comply with
certain minimum standards to be eligible for favorable tax treatment. Participants in
qualified plans are restricted from deducting contributions to another tax-favored
retirement program, the Individual Retirement Account. Service members are treated as if
they had a qualified pension plan for the purpose of determining IRA deductibility, but are
not provided the same protections that qualified private pension plans provide. This
chapter describes IRAs, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the statute
governing private pension plans to highlight the inequity of such treatment. It
recommends extending ERA deductibility to all service members, regardless of income, to
redress this inequity.
B. INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
Employer-sponsored pensions are a tax-advantaged way for workers to save for
retirement. Employers deduct their contributions to pension plans from corporate
earnings, but workers do not pay taxes on this deferred compensation during the period in
which it is earned. Pensions also reduce taxes for employers and employees while
increasing the rate of return on retirement savings since taxes are deferred for interest,
dividends, and capital gains. Unfortunately, such beneficial treatment of retirement saving
was available only to workers covered by an employer-provided pension, so Congress
implemented IRAs as part of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 to extend the
benefits of tax-deferred retirement saving to workers not covered by a pension. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, which extended ERA eligibility to all
American workers, reflected Congress' desire to increase private retirement saving
throughout the population. Then in 1986, the Tax Reform Act restricted the deductibility
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for certain workers to reduce income tax revenue loss resulting from ERA participation.
(Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1988.)
Currently, any worker with income can contribute each year the lesser of 100
percent of his earnings or $2,000. Two-earner couples can contribute $2,000 each for a
total of $4,000 annually. The annual contribution limit for spousal ERAs, available for
workers with nonworking spouses, was raised to $2,000 from $250 in 1997. The Internal
Revenue Service defines income as wages, salaries, tips, professional fees, bonuses,
commissions, self-employment income, and alimony payments. Income does not include
rental income, capital gains on the sale of property, interest, or dividends (Department of
the Treasury, 1996b).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not eliminate ERA eligibility for anyone but it did
reverse ERTA by restricting contribution deductibility for certain taxpayers. Workers not
covered by an employer-provided pension can still fully deduct their annual contributions
to IRAs, but workers who are covered by a qualified pension plan cannot deduct
contributions if their adjusted gross income exceeds the thresholds. If either spouse of a
two-earner couple is covered by a pension plan, both are considered covered for the
purpose of contribution deductibility. Single workers with adjusted gross income less than
$25,000 and joint filers with adjusted gross income less than $40,000 can deduct their
entire contributions. Single taxpayers with adjusted gross income greater than $35,000
and joint filers with income greater than $50,000 cannot deduct any of their contribution.
Taxpayers with income between these contributions can deduct a portion of their
contribution that decreases with income. 7
The taxes on capital gains, dividends, and interest that accrue to ERA assests are
deferred until they are withdrawn, regardless of whether the contributions were
deductible, partially deductible, or non-deductible. When distributions are made from
IRAs, the funds are taxed as ordinary income. Deductible contributions are taxed when
7 Single taxpayers whose income is in the phase-out range can compute their deduction from the
following formula: 0.2*(35,000 - AGI). Married taxpayers use the formula 0.2*(50,000 - AGI).
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they are withdrawn, but non-deductible contributions are not since they were taxed in the
year they were earned. (Department of the Treasury, 1996b.)
In addition to income taxes due, a ten percent penalty is imposed on distributions
received before the IRA owner is 59 1/2. This penalty is intended to encourage long-term
retirement saving, and discourage the use of IRAs as a method of short-term tax
avoidance. Workers can make contributions until they reach age 70V2, and must begin
receiving distributions by 1 April of the year after they turn 70V2.
Section 219 of the Internal Revenue Code specifies that active participation in an
employer-sponsored pension plan restricts contribution deductibility for workers with
adjusted gross incomes exceeding the specified limits. Workers are considered active
participants if they are accruing credit for a potential retirement benefit, regardless of
whether they have been vested in that benefit. Since military personnel accrue years of
service for the purpose of calculating their retirement pay, they are considered active
participants in a pension plan, and thus face the income restrictions on contribution
deductions. (DoD OSD, 1996 and Department of the Treasury, 1996a.)
C. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974
To qualify for favorable tax treatement, pension plans must comply with certain
standards established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. These standards,
which cover vesting, funding, and reporting features of pension plans, protect the interests
of employees. The Congressional Research Service summarizes the purpose of ERISA as
follows:
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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (PL. 93-
406) is designed to protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries of
most private sector employee benefit plans. Most of the law's provisions
deal with pension plans. ERISA does not require that employers provide
pensions, but those that do must meet minimum standards in regard to who
must be covered, how long a person has to work to be entitled to a
pension, and how much must be set aside each year by the employer to
provide pensions when they are due. ERISA also created the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp to guarantee the payment of pension benefits in
case of underfunded defined benefit pension plan is ended. Public
employee pension plans and those of curches are generally not subject to
the law or its protections. (Schmitt, 1994.)
Qualified pension plans get tax-favored treatment, while nonqualified plans, those
that do not meet minimum ERISA standards, do not. When Congress actied to reduce the
revenue loss from IRAs, it limited contribution deductibility for workers with qualified
pension plans since they already enjoy tax-favored retirement saving. Workers without
pension plans, or with nonqualified plans, remained eligible to deduct their IRA
contributions.
Military retirement is treated as a qualified plan by the Internal Revenue Code,
even though it does not comply with several ERISA standards. Although public sector
pension plans are exempt from ERISA standards, it is patently unfair to treat military
retirement as if it qualified for tax-favored treatment when in fact it does not.
Military retirement violates minimum ERISA requirements in several areas, the
most significant of which is vesting standards. Vesting is the point at which an employee
retains a nonforfeitable right to at least some portion of the retirement benefit accrued to
date. This right is retained even if the employee ceases to be employed before they reach
the eligibility age for benefits. Under ERISA, employers may vest their workers in one of
two ways. They may use a graduated schedule, where employees are vested in a portion
of their employer's contributions that increases to full vesting over a designated period.
Alternatively, employers may cliff-vest the employees in benefits by entitling employees to
1 00 percent of the employer contributions all at once when they achieve a designated
lenght of tenure with the company. The minimum vesting schedules under both are shown
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in Table 3.1. Employers may vest their workers sooner than these minimum standards,
but plans that do not meet the standards are considered nonqualified, and thus not eligible
for tax-favored treatment (EBRI, 1988).
Table 3 1 Minimum Vesting Standards Under ERISA
YEARS OF SERVICE PERCENTAGE UNDER PERCENTAGE UNDER
CLIFF VESTING GRADUATED VESTING
1 percent percent
2 percent percent
3 percent 20 percent
4 percent 40 percent
5 1 00 percent 60 percent
6 100 percent 80 percent
7 100 percent 100 percent
Source: Congressional Research Service
Military retirement diverges sharply from ERISA vesting standards. It requires
personnel to serve 20 years before they are vested in their retirement benefit. This 20-year
cliff-vesting provision markedly separates military retirement from qualified private
pension plans that receive tax-favored treatment.
ERISA requires that pension plans be fully funded. Defined contribution plans are,
by definition, fully funded, since the future retirement benefit accrues in an individual
account for each worker. The employer contributes to the account in the year when the
retirement benefit is earned, and the employee is vested in employer contributions
according to the schedules shown in Table 3.1. The worker bears the full responsibility
for investment gains and losses on assets in the account. Emplyees are immediately vested
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in any mandatory or voluntary contributions they make to the plan. Defined benefit plans,
in contrast, do not have individual accounts for each worker. Instead these plans provide
an annuity upon retirement, the amount of which is a function of career pay and length of
service. The employer must make annual contributions to the pension plan fund to pay for
the expected retirement benefit that will become payable to employees as a result of their
service during the year and bears the risk of any investment losses on plan assets. The
amount of the annual contribution required to cover this future liability, called the normal
cost, is computed based on sound actuarial assumptions. Unfunded liabilities that arise
from past work for which no contributions were made, or from retroactive changes to the
benefit formula, must be amortized over no more than 30 years. (Schmitt, 1994.)
Military retirement was funded on a pay-as-you-go basis until the establishment of
the Military Retirement Fund in 1984 brought the system into compliance with the full
funding requirement of ERISA. However, the unfunded liability of $528.7 billion which
resulted from the switch to accrual-based accounting in 1984 was amortized over 60
years, rather than 30 years as required by ERISA. The funded portion of the liability, the
Military Retirement Fund, is invested in U.S. Treasury securities. Until the liability is fully
amortized, the pension benefits of current and future retirees are backed only by the word
of the federal government.
The administrator of the pension plan must furnish each participant with an annual
report of the status of the plan and its assets. The report must be written in a manner
which can be understood by the "average person," and must describe the benefits
available under the plan, as well as the method for claiming benefits and the circumstances
which can result in disqualification or ineligibility for benefits. While the military provides
separation counseling for retiring and terminated service members, no annual report on the
retirement systeme is provided.
ERISA provides a legal basis for the concept of the implicit promise discussed in
Chapter II. The implicit promise is that the military will not change the terms of the
retirement system for personnel who have already entered the service. Even though there
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is no written provision for such a promise, practice and general understanding confirms its
existence. ERISA prohibits employers from changing the terms of a pension plan in a way
that reduces the benefits employees have already accrued under the plan. If the vesting
schedule is changed, the percentage of the vested benefit accrued by an employee prior to
the change cannot be reduced. Additionally, plan participants with at least five years of
service may elect to remain under the vesting schedule that existed prior to the plan's
ammendment (Schmitt, 1994.)
If an employer chooses to provide a pension plan for its employees, it must meet
coverage standards to be considered "qualified" under the Internal Revenue Code .
ERISA mandates that employees over 21 years of age with one year of service must be
covered by the employer-sponsored pension plan, but plans which immediately vest all
active participants may require employees to accumulate three years of service and be 2
1
years old before they are covered. Employers are required to count all service by
employees older than 18 towards the plan's vesting requirements and benefit formula.
Military retirement complies with the coverage standards since all active and reserve
service is counted towards retirement, and all personnel can receive retirement if they
reach 20 years of service.
Pension plans that comply with the minimum standards set forth under ERISA and
the Internal Revenue Code are considered qualified plans and are eligible for favorable tax
treatment. Employers can deduct contributions to qualified pension plans from their
before-tax earnings, thus reducing their tax burden. Employees are not required to pay
taxes on these contributions as current compensationm, and the capital gains, interest, and
dividend income on pension plan assests are tax-deferred until they are paid out as
benefits (EBRI, 1988.) The fact that employees with employer-sponsored pension plans
already have a tax-favored way to save for retirement supported Congress's decision in
the 1986 Tax Reform Act to restrict contribution deductibility to workers without
qualified pension plans.
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D. MILITARY PENSIONS AND IRA CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTIBILITY
The disparity in the tax treatment of military pensions and the protections of
retirement rights for military personnel invites the argument that military retirement should
be treated as an unqualified plan, making service members eligible to deduct their IRA
contributions. On one hand, the Internal Revenue Code specifies that military retirement
is considered a qualified pension plan for the purpose of IRA contribution deductibility so
military personnel are treated identically to participants in qualified private pension plans.
On the other hand, ERISA exempts public retirement plans from compliance with its
provisions, so service members are not entitled to the same vesting, reporting, and funding
protections afforded private sector workers.
The inequity of this situation could be redressed by changing the treatment of
military pensions under the tax code, or by changing the retirement system to bring it into
full compliance with ERISA. For reasons enumerated in Chapter II, dramatic modification
of the retirement system is unlikely, leaving a change in tax treatment as the most realistic
option. The argument that military personnel should be able to deduct their IRA
contributions regardless of income can be addressed from both equity and efficiency
standpoints.
1. Equity
The author argues that it is unfair to treat service members as if they had a
qualified pension plan, while not providing them the same protections and portability that
private pension plans give their participants. To be thorough, however, the discussion
should address equity as it pertains to the three principle shareholders of the military
retirement system: military personnel who separate prior to retirement eligibility, military
retirees (including military personnel who eventually reach retirement), and taxpayers.
The system is obviously unfair to the significant portion of military personnel who
are separated, voluntarily or involuntarily, before they reach retirement eligibility. Only 1
7
percent of those who join the armed forces ever receive military pension benefits,
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compared to the two-thirds of all workers, and the vast majority of those earning more
than the median income who retire with pensions (Ippolito, 1986.) Several of the
commissions that reviewed military retirement criticized the plan for its unfairness8 . The
Joint Army-Navy Pay Board of 1947 referred to the system as a "tontine," an archaic
financial scheme which benefits the few at the expense of the many. The unfairness of the
system is evident to anyone who serves honorably for five, 10 or 15 years, and leaves the
military with nothing but a handshake (Navy Times, 1991.) It is difficult to justify
identical tax treatment of military and private pension plans when a service member can
separate after 19 years with no right to retirement benefits, while a private sector worker
who changes employers after seven years retains 100 percent of her accumulated
retirement benefits. Disallowing IRA deductions for military personnel by summarily
ruling that military retirement is "qualified" despite the obvious differences in rights and
protections adds insult to injury.
The system is more than fair to current retirees, and the minority of service
members who become eligible for retirement. The annuity is a generous percentage of
active duty compensation, it is protected against inflation, and is payable immediately upon
retirement, regardless of age. A service member who enlists at 1 8 years of age and retires
from the military at age 38 with an immediate annuity of 40 percent of basic pay9 , has little
basis for complaints of unfair treatment. However, military pensions are not excessively
generous, but reflect the fact that military retirement is different from civilian retirement.
Military retirees are usually separated before the traditional retirement age, and must find a
new career until they can retire permananently. Military retirement compensates for the
second-career income loss associated with this transition. Military retirees are also eligible
" The Joint Army-Navy Pay Board (1947), the Interagency Committee on Uniformed Services Retirement
and Survivor Benefits (1971), the Defense Manpower Commission (1976), the President's Commission on
Military Compensation (1977), and the Grace Commission (1984) considered 20-year cliff vesting unfair
to the vast majority of service members and recommended earlier vesting to correct the inequity.
9 Basic pay is less than total military compensation, so care should be taken when comparing the annuity
as a percentage of pay to the size of the annuity for private pension plans.
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for recall to active duty and remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, while
very few private sector employees can be forced back to work or remain subject to
workplace regulations after retirement. Allowing military personnel who will eventually
retire to deduct their contributions increases the generosity of the system.
Some critics of military retirement consider it unfair to taxpayers because of its
cost. In a particularly one-sided and poorly researched polemic, Jacques Gansler describes
the system as "the most expensive of all federal entitlement programs financed exclusively
from general revenues," and maintains that there is little justification for maintaining such
an overly-generous system (Gansler, 1989.) Gansler completely ignores the role of
military retirement as a separation incentive, and makes an unfounded claim that physical
strength and prowess are no longer essential in today's high-technology armed forces. His
view of military retirement is also fundamentally flawed because the system is not an
entitlement program, but rather deferred compensation, part of an overall package
designed to attract and retain a workforce of the desired size and quality. If the country is
buying too much defense, spending more than it needs by hiring a work force that is either
too large, over-qualified for the task, or both, then compensation such as retirement pay
can be reduced to bring the force structure in line with the nation's needs. We can spend
less on military personnel, and as the work of Asch and Warner shows, get fewer and less
qualified personnel for it, if we think the resulting force will be sufficient to accomplish
our national military strategy.
Military retirement is more costly than typical private sector retirement programs,
but this does not mean that the system costs too much. Rather it reflects the additional
inducements required to attract and retain personnel in a profession whose hardships and
risk to life and limb exceed that of the typical non-military job 10 .
10 Protective services such as policemen and fire fighters also have jobs whose risks are comparable to
those associated with military service. That retirement benefits for workers in these fields exceed that of
other public employees whose jobs do not involve such risk supports the contention that compensation
must be higher to attract personnel to these fields.
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But this argument is not a question of fairness to taxpayers. It is instead an issue
of spending priorities and strategy decisions. Military retirement can be called unfair to
taxpayers only if the country is not getting what it pays for. If service members, who are
compensated through active duty pay, benefits, and retirement pay, do not provide the
required services for their pay, then the American taxpayers are being cheated. However,
few critics claim that this is the case. The President, Congress, and the American people
must decide how much they are willing to spend on military personnel, and how much
defense is enough. The country will get what it pays for. If the nation wishes to spend less
on military retirement while maintaining the size and quality of the force, it will have to
raise compensation elsewhere. Retirement pay is not an entitlement, or a social welfare
program, as Gansler implies, but rather a cost of doing business. Extending IRA
deductibility to service members would not directly increase defense costs, but would
slightly reduce tax revenues. This revenue loss is no more unfair to taxpayers in genereal
than any other benefit that reduces taxes for a particular group, industry, or business.
2. Efficiency
If substituting IRA deductibility for some other form of compensation could
provide a military force of the same quality and size at less cost, then this would be a more
efficient way to manage the force. To determine whether extending IRA deductibility to
service members would be more efficient, the effect of doing so on retention, effort
motiviation, and ability sorting must be evaluated. The author concludes that the impact
on all three areas will be very small because the cash value of IRA deductibility is
equivalent to a very small increase in compensation.
ERA deductibility should have no impact on effort motivation for military
personnel. It is not a direct part of the compensation package, and the benefit, the
reduction in taxes, is identical for all service members, regardless of their effort. The top
perfomers will receive the same tax reduction as the malingerers, assuming they make
identical contributions, so their is no additional incentive to work harder.
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However, IRA deductibility, if viewed as part of the total compensation package
will affect the skewness of the pay structure. The personnel whose pay would be most
affected are those at the higher pay grades since more junior personnel, who, because they
are paid less, are probably below the income thresholds, can already deduct all or part of
their contributions. The lower marginal tax rates for junior personnel reduce the cash
value of the deduction compared to the value for senior personnel. This change skews the
pay structure towards the senior pay grades, and, theoretically, provides an additional
incentive for personnel to work harder for advancement. The additional skewness,
however, would not be more than a few hundred dollars per year. Therefore IRA
deductibility is unlikely to motivate much additional effort.
ERA deductibility could improve ability sorting. Active-duty personnel do not
enjoy the tax advantage of deducting their ERA contributions. For many service members,
this advantage would be worth $560 annually, but it varies between $300 and $620
depending on the service member's tax bracket. Personnel in the lower tax bracket, for
whom the deduction would be worth $300, are probably below the income thresholds and
qualify to deduct their ERA contributions anyway. Each year personnel stay on active
duty, they lose this advantage. For someone who knows he will not advance far enough
to qualify for retirement, this loss provides an additional incentive to separate early.
Allowing all personnel to deduct contributions would eliminate this disadvantage, and
would thus reduce the separation incentive for personnel who know they are not qualified
for senior billets. Conceivably, universal ERA deductibility for service members could
weaken the self-sorting mechanism.
For several reasons, the author concludes that the actual impact on ability sorting
would be very weak. First, the tax advantage is a small portion of total compensation.
For personnel who would actually receive a tax reduction, single people with adjusted
income over $35,000 and married people over $50,000, the deduction is at most 1.6 to
1 . 1 percent of their annual adjusted gross income, and is a much smaller percentage of
total compensation. Such a small pay raise is unlikely to have a measurable effect on
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behavior. Second, by the time a service member's income exceeds the deduction
thresholds he is already past his first term and in the middle-career phase, at which point
the effect of a $560 increase in annual income will be overwhelmed by other
considerations 11 . Third, separating from the military will not guarantee that the service
member will be able to deduct his ERA contributions. If his new employer provides a
qualified pension plan, his IRA contributions will still be nondeductible.
For similar reasons, the effect of IRA deductibility on retention will be small. A
one percent pay raise is unlikely to have a significant impact retentions, and the author
believes that few people will link the tax advantage to military employment when making
separation decisions.
There is a cost associated with modifying the tax treatment of military retirement.
Although there is no change in the Department of Defense budget, allowing military
personnel to deduct IRA contributions would reduce personal income tax revenue for the
Treasury. However, since universal ERA deductibility for military personnel will have
such a small impact on force structure, there is not an efficiency argument to be made
either in favor of or against implementing the change.
E. CONCLUSION
Individual Retirement Accounts give non-covered employees a tax-deferred way to
save for retirement. Although military personnel are technically covered by military
retirement, anyone who separates with less than 20 years of service is decidedly
uncovered.
Few things are more important for morale than that service members
believe that they are being treated as fairly as possible, and conversely, few
things undermine moreale more than a sense of unfair treatement. (DoD
OSD, 1996, p. 7.)
1
!
Promotability, desirability of the next duty station, post-military employment prospects, and family
considerations will dominate the separations decision.
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The treatment of military retirement as a qualified pension plan under the Internal
Revenue Code is inconsistent with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and
unfair to the majority of personnel who never qualify for a military pension. Military
personnel do not enjoy the protections of the law designed to protect employee retirement
rights, but they are taxed as though they were. Allowing military personnel to deduct IRA
contributions would eliminate this inequity while not significantly affecting force structure,
current retiree benefits, or the American taxpayer.
44
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Congress designed Individual Retirement Accounts to accomplish two purposes.
The first purpose, to provide a tax-deferred retirement-saving vehicle for workers without
a pension plan, was discussed in Chapter III. The second, to increase national saving, is
discussed in this chapter. If ERAs, in particular the tax deduction for contributions,
encourage people to save more money, then this provides one more reason to extend
universal IRA deductibility to service members.
Net national saving, defined as private saving plus public saving, has been declining
for decades. In 1950, U.S. net national saving was 12.3 percent of net national product,
but fell to 2.7 percent by 1993 (Hubbard and Skinner, 1996). Congress hoped IRAs
would help reverse this trend by providing a higher rate of return on saving dedicated to
retirement. However, ERAs have two opposing effects on national saving. They can
increase private saving by encouraging people to save money they would otherwise have
spent, but they decrease government saving by reducing personal income tax revenues.
Economists have debated the effect of ERAs on national saving since the policy
was implemented, but are still far from agreement. One group of economists believes
ERAs effectively stimulate additional saving. Another group argues that contributors
merely shift funds from existing assets, or redirect savings destined for other accounts into
ERAs, resulting in a tax windfall for contributors while yielding no additional saving. This
group argues that ERAs adversely affect national saving because the program provides no
additional private saving, but reduces government saving because the reduction in tax
revenues increases the federal debt.
Economic optimists estimate that 50 percent of contributions are new saving, 20
percent are shifted from existing assets, and 30 percent are the result of the tax advantage
(Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1995). Several arguments support these estimates:
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•Asset growth in IRAs was larger than the median financial assets of households
before IRAs were available. The average American did not do much saving
prior to the introduction of tax-deferred saving accounts, and subsequent to
the start of IRAs, growth in IRA balances exceeded the pre-existing saving
balances.
Non-ERA financial assets of contributors did not decline enough to account for
the increase in IRA assets. Additionally, non-IRA financial assets did not
decline relative to the assets of people without IRAs, indicating that
contributors are not redirecting money that they would have saved anyway.
Holding age and income constant, financial assets increased as people had
more time to contribute money to IRAs.
The psychology of IRAs encouraged people to deposit money in the accounts,
and to leave funds in the accounts undisturbed.
Economic pessimists concur that approximately 30 percent of IRA balances come
from the tax advantage, but argue that no more than two or three percent of contributions
are new saving, claiming instead that the majority of contributions are either redirected
saving the contributor would have made anyway, or come from existing assets. They
counter the new saving claims on several grounds.
•
•
Estimates of existing assets ofIRA contributors at the point of ERA
introduction are biased downward because they include the assets of people
who do not have IRAs. Using the existing assets of the entire population to
estimate the existing assets ofIRA holders prior to the introduction of ERAs
underestimates existing assets of contributors because the population at large
saves less than the smaller portion of the population that contributes to ERAs.
To get an accurate measure of the existing assets ofERA contributors prior to
the introduction of ERAs, the sample from which median wealth is measured
must be restricted to the group of people who would save in ERAs.
The definition of assets used by the optimists is too narrow. Including assets
like home equity in the measurement of wealth shows a much higher rate of
saving among IRA contributors and casts doubt on the claim that people did
little saving prior to the introduction of ERAs.
IRA contributions have been financed by reducing home equity or increasing
mortgage debt.
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• The variation in IRA balances for households of similar age and income can be
explained by factors other than the length ofIRA eligibility.
This chapter presents the results of the author's review of the economic debate on
IRAs' effectiveness in stimulating new saving. It concludes that the two estimates on the
portion of ERAs that is new saving represent the extreme ends of the spectrum. The actual
portion of new saving lies somewhere in the middle. While some of the evidence and
methods used to calculate the optimistic estimate bias the findings upward, the
adjustments called for by the pessimists are likewise overstated. The author agrees with
Glenn Hubbard's and Jonathon Skinner's estimate that 26 percent of contributions are
new saving.
B. THE AMBIGUOUS IMPACT OF THE RATE OF RETURN
The belief that IRAs will stimulate new saving is based on the theory that the
higher rate of return provided by the tax-deferred treatment of contributions and gains in
the accounts will encourage people to substitute saving for consumption. That this occurs
is far from certain. The higher rate of return over traditional saving vehicles affects the
incentive to save for retirement in two offsetting ways which are known as the income and
substitution effects. This section investigates these effects and the responsiveness of
Americans to rates of return.
1. The Income Effect
Because the tax treatment of IRAs makes the rate of return on assets in Individual
Retirement Accounts higher than the rate of return on assets in traditional taxable saving
vehicles, capital accrues more quickly in IRAs. If the investment amount is fixed, assets in
an IRA will reach a target level more quickly than assets in taxable accounts. If the target
balance and accumulation period are fixed, smaller contributions to IRAs yield the same
balance as larger contributions to taxable accounts. The income effect, demonstrated in
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Figure 4. 1 Accumulation of Savings in IRAs Versus Taxable Accounts
Adapted from Ippolito (1992)
48
assets for retirement by a specific date. Assume two individuals begin saving for
retirement at age 35 and intend to retire by age 65. Both face a constant marginal tax rate
of 33 percent, and both want to accumulate $100,000 in post-tax assets by retirement.
Assume the pre-tax rate of return is ten percent. The person with the IRA makes annual
contributions of $750 and accumulates gains at an annual rate of 10 percent, since taxes
on the gains are deferred. Over thirty years, the balance grows to $150,000 yielding
$100,000 after taxes are paid on the entire balance at the time of withdrawal. Asset
accumulation for this individual is shown by the ERA line. The person with the traditional
savings account, who pays taxes on the gains in the year they are earned, accrues interest
at a post-tax rate of 6.7 percent. The lower rate of return on the tax-exposed vehicle
requires annual contributions of $971 to provide the same $100,000 in retirement assets.
Asset accumulation for this person is shown by the Savings Account line. The income
effect of the higher rate of return allows people to reduce their saving rate if their goal is
to reach a specific dollar goal within a fixed time.
Note that although the saving rate and initial asset accumulation are lower for the
ERA contributor, the accumulated assets exceed that of the taxable saving account after
several years.
2. The Substitution Effect
The income effect is not the only way that Individual Retirement Accounts alter
saving behavior. These tax-deferred saving accounts provide an offsetting substitution
effect resulting from their targeted purpose, which encourages people to save more.
Retirement consumption is cheaper relative to current consumption, since assets dedicated
to retirement via ERAs realize a higher rate of return than assets consumed immediately or
saved for near term consumption. Thus, people will want to consume more of it. People
increase retirement consumption by lengthening the retirement period through early
separation, and by directing a higher proportion of lifetime assets to retirement
consumption.
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To demonstrate this effect on saving behavior, refer again to Figure 4.1. Faced
with the lower relative cost of retirement, a third person decides to retire early at age 63,
and to increase retirement consumption by 25 percent. This person makes annual
contributions of $1141 and accumulates $186,567 by age 63, yielding post-tax assets of
$125,000. Asset accumulation for this person is shown by the Early Retirement line.
Under this scenario, the saving rate and account balances are higher for LRAs than for
taxable saving accounts..
Individual Retirement Accounts have an ambiguous impact on saving behavior
because of the offsetting nature of the income and substitution effects. The net effect
depends upon which one dominates, and no evidence points clearly to the supremacy of
either.
3. Responsiveness to the Rate of Return
The substitution effect implies that people increase their saving as the after-tax rate
of return increases. Economic pessimists who believe that ERAs do not induce new saving
argue that Americans are in fact unresponsive to the rate of return and hold their saving
rate constant regardless of changes in the rate of return. The optimists who believe IRAs
do stimulate additional saving appear to accept this contention, for they do little to refute
it.
Michael Boskin demonstrated in 1978 that the studies showing a constant saving
rate during periods of changing after-tax rate of returns are flawed, and he provided
evidence that Americans do adjust their saving behavior in response to changes in the rate
of return (Boskin, 1978.) Even if the average American does not change his saving
behavior in response to changes in the rate of return, it does not follow that IRA
contributors do not respond to an improved rate of return. ERA contributors are dissimilar
to the average American in many ways, one of which is saving behavior. ERA contributors
save much more than the average household, and it is plausible that they respond
differently to the rate of return. Thus, ERAs may induce additional saving among the
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population of savers, regardless of the impact on the average American (Ozanne, 1992).
If savers are more sensitive to rates of return, then ERAs may induce contributors whose
ideal allocation of saving to retirement accounts is some amount less than $2,000 to
contribute the annual maximum.
C. DESCRIPTIVE ARGUMENTS ON THE IMPACT OF IRAS
Although economists disagree on many key issues, there are a substantial number
of basic concepts and principles which are commonly accepted. The parties to the debate
on the efficacy of IRAs have turned to these areas of common ground in an attempt to
determine how people will respond to a tax-favored saving program and to justify their
conclusions on the issue. Topics such as fiingibility, marginal incentives, and response to
taxes have been employed in the debate. This section summarizes some of the arguments
based on the descriptive or theoretical evidence concerning the response of citizens to
IRAs
Ultimately, the analysis based on the common principles of economics has been
inconclusive since neither side has developed an unassailable case that proves the impact
of ERAs on saving behavior. The arguments themselves are illuminating, however, and
warrant discussion because they describe how IRAs and personal saving decisions are
related.
1. The Substitutability of IRAs for Other Forms of Saving
The hypothesis that ERAs are perfect substitutes for other forms of saving supports
the claim that ERA contributions come from existing assets or diverted savings. If this
theory is true, then savers will first deposit their money in ERAs because of the higher rate
of return. ERAs will not induce new savings for anyone who saves more than the annual
contribution limit because there is no marginal incentive to do so. If a contributor already
saves more than $2,000, then ERAs provide no marginal improvement in the rate of return
on additional saving, and will not encourage people to save more money. The income
effect dominates under the substitutability assumption, so ERAs may reduce saving
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because households can still reach their saving goal tomorrow while consuming more
today.
Despite the ten percent penalty on withdrawals before age 59 1/2, there are several
reasons why IRAs may be perfect substitutes for other saving vehicles. First, contributors
older than 59 1/2 are not subject to the early withdrawal penalty. For these contributors,
there should be no material difference between IRAs and taxable saving instruments, other
than the rate of return. Second, persons with significant non-IRA financial assets are less
likely to need their ERA money to meet immediate cash requirements. The ten percent
penalty will not differentiate between ERAs and other savings vehicles if the contributor is
unlikely to need the funds before age 59 1/2. (Engen, Gale, and Sholz, 1996a and Gale and
Scholz, 1992).
According to Eric Engen, William Gale, and John Karl Sholz (1996a), 70 percent
of IRA saving in 1986 was done by people over 59 years of age who had non-ERA
financial assets exceeding $20,000. This group of contributors should find ERAs good
substitutes for other forms of saving and the impact on their net saving is probably small.
However, much evidence contradicts the theory of perfect substitutability. If ERAs
were perfect substitutes for other saving vehicles, then every household with even one
dollar in savings should have one, because of the higher rate of return. Yet only 25
percent of households own ERAs. Even among the prime candidates for ERA ownership,
households aged 55 to 64 with income between $50,000 and $75,000, one third do not
have accounts, despite the obvious tax advantage. Clearly a significant portion of the
population does not treat ERAs as perfect substitutes for other saving vehicles. (Skinner,
1992.)
Some other anomalies suggest that people do not approach saving in the rational,
rate-of-return maximizing manner that the perfect substitutability assumption requires.
For example, some 40 1 (k) account owners make ERA contributions even though they have
not made their annual maximum 401(k) contribution. Since employer matching of
employee contributions to 401(k) accounts increases the rate of return over ERAs, it
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would be rational for workers to direct all retirement savings into 401(k)s up to the point
where employer matching contributions cease. After the employer contribution cutoff
point, the rates of return between IRAs and 401(k)s are identical. The fact that many
workers contribute to IRAs when they are still eligible for employer matching of additional
401(k) contributions suggests that savings vehicles are not perfectly interchangeable and
that people may not approach saving in a completely rational manner. (Poterba, Venti,
and Wise, 1995)
The distribution of IRA deposits in a year also indicate a less than rational
approach to saving. To fully realize the tax advantage, IRA holders should make their
entire annual contribution on the first day of the tax year to maximize amount of time their
funds will accrue tax-deferred interest, dividends, and capital gains. However, the bulk of
ERA contributions are made immediately before the April 15 tax-filing deadline in the
following year, foregoing 16 months of tax-deferred appreciation. Clearly, utilizing the
tax advantage cannot be the only motivation for IRA contributions. (Venti and Wise,
1992.)
The assumption that all money is fungible lies at the heart of the substitutability
theory. If IRAs are perfect substitutes for other saving vehicles, people must believe that
a dollar in retirement saving is identical to a dollar in a child's college fund, which is equal
to a dollar in a joint checking account. People must treat all these assets singularly as
wealth, without differentiating between cash, home equity, stock holdings, pensions, or
future Social Security benefits. If this is the case, then IRAs are likely to be effective
substitutes for other saving. Richard Thaler (1992) believes this assumption is
fundamentally flawed and attacks the substitutability theory at its foundation. He argues
that the evidence does not support the assumption because people violate fungibility in
systematic ways. He believes people use a system of mental accounting to divide assets
into four general categories: current income, liquid assets, home equity, and future
earnings. People do not treat these assets interchangeably, but designate certain funds for
certain purposes, and vary their propensity to consume funds according to the purpose.
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For example, most people will readily spend money from a current income account like
checking, but exercise more discretion before consuming liquid assets like saving account
or mutual funds balances. They are far more cautious about spending home equity, and
are unwilling, or unable, to consume future earnings like pension wealth or Social Security
entitlements.
This ordering of marginal propensities to consume follows the level of
temptation associated with a positive balance in each account. Households
need to exert willpower to resist spending their regular paycheck but find it
easy to avoid spending the value of the home or income they will not see
until many years later. (Thaler, 1992, p. 147.)
Fungibility means all assets are treated interchangeably, regardless of form,
location, or timing. A simple example shows the inaccuracy of this assumption, at least in
its most extreme form. If a person is saving her optimal amount and allocating assets
across her lifecycle, setting aside a portion of her current income to pay for consumption
in retirement, then an increase in pension benefits will reduce the amount of current saving
required to fund retirement consumption. If her employer increased his contribution to her
pension plan by one dollar, then she should reduce current discretionary saving by one
dollar to maintain her ideal distribution of income across her lifetime. Not only does
common sense tell us that people do not behave this way, but also empirical evidence 12
shows that an increase in future pension benefits does not increase current consumption.
(Thaler, 1992, p. 148.)
12 In a detailed article published in Economic Inquiry, Thaler and Shefrin cite studies by Philip Cagan
(1965), George Katona (1965), Francis Green (1981), Mordecai Kurz (1981), MA. King and L.D.L.
Dicks-Mireaux (1982), and Peter Diamond and Jerry Hausman (1984). These studies showed that the
reduction in descretionary saving resulting from an increase in pension saving was uniformly and
substantially less than 100 percent of the change in pension saving. Several of the studies showed that an
increase in pension saving increased discretionary saving as well. Although the estimate of the change in
saving behavior varied between the studies, none provided evidence that people reduce discretionary
savings by significant amounts in response to an increase in pension saving.
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The fact that people identify savings for specific purposes also contradicts the
fiingibility assumption. Many people save money for specific purposes such as a down
payment on a house or new car, next summer's vacation, or a child's education. Any
unwillingness to transfer money between these accounts violates the fiingibility
assumption. Consumer debt also contradicts it. A person who maintains a balance on a
credit card charging 18 percent annual interest while having cash in a savings account
earning five percent interest is not treating money as fungible.
This argument that many people do not treat money as fungible has several
implications for IRAs. First it suggests that people do not treat savings for retirement and
savings for near term consumption interchangeably, so that an increase in retirement
saving does not necessarily reduce other saving. Second, the elements of IRAs aimed at
encouraging new saving are likely to be effective in the context of mental accounts. The
immediate reward of a tax deduction for contributions, combined with the fact that the
funds are out of arms reach should encourage new saving and keep assets in the capital
pool.
While some substitution undoubtedly occurs, IRAs are clearly not perfect
substitutes for other savings. The evidence shows that people do not approach IRA
saving in the rational, return-maximizing manner that the perfect substitution assumption
demands. If IRAs are imperfect substitutes for other saving, then at least some portion of
contributions must be new saving. Even the portion of IRAs that are redirected assets
may increase net savings, as Thaler's argument on mental accounting suggests. Funds in a
traditional saving vehicle may be withdrawn at any time after they are deposited. IRA
contributions, on the other hand, will remain in the capital pool longer due to the penalty
on early withdrawals and the reduced propensity of savers to spend money intended for
retirement. Thus, regardless of the contribution source, IRAs should maintain savings for
longer periods than other forms of savings.
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2. The Marginal Effect of the Contribution Limit
Some economists who believe that IRAs will not stimulate additional saving argue
that the higher rate of return provided by ERAs will induce contributors to increase their
saving only if the accounts provide an increased rate of return on marginal saving. For
example, consider a person who saves $1,500 dollars a year in a traditional savings vehicle
yielding an annual return often percent before taxes and seven percent after tax, assuming
a 30 percent tax rate. This person can increase her annual rate of return on that savings to
ten percent by depositing the money in an IRA. The ERA also increases by three
percentage points the incentive for her to save more than $1,500 because her current
annual saving is below the contribution limit. Thus, an ERA increases her marginal
incentive to save more than $1,500 and should raise her saving. Now consider a person
already saving $2,000 annually in a taxable savings account. He too can increase his
return to ten percent by depositing his money in an ERA. However, if he is contemplating
a $1 increase in saving, his rate of return on the additional dollar will be only seven
percent, the same return without the ERA. The higher rate of return on saving is no longer
available because this person has reached his annual contribution limit and additional
saving must be deposited in a taxable savings account. Thus, for anyone contributing at or
above the limit, ERAs offer no marginal incentive to increase saving.
Economists Bermann, Cordes, and Ozanne assume only the marginal rate of return
matters and conclude that ERAs will not significantly increase net savings because
approximately 75 percent of annual contributions are limit contributions. For limit
contributors, ERAs provide no marginal incentive to save more. (Hubbard and Skinner,
1996)
This oversimplifies the effect of the limit, however. When examining marginal
incentives to save, lifetime limits are more relevant to the issue than annual limits. Even if
the percentage of annual contributions that are at the limit remains constant, the size of
each individual's contribution may change from year to year. A person who contributes to
the limit in one year but not in the next has a marginal, if unused, incentive to save. Data
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from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) between 1983 to 1986 showed that only 30
percent of contributors made limit contributions in each of three years. Thus, 70 percent
of contributors had some marginal incentive to save over a three-year period. (Hubbard
and Skinner, 1996.)
Their conclusion also ignores the effect of the limit itself on saving behavior. The
author believes that the $2,000 annual limit encourages people to contribute exactly this
amount for several reasons. First, by saving less than the annual limit, the contributor
forfeits some part of the tax reduction. The failed experiment with tax shelters in the
1970s proved that people will go to great lengths to avoid taxes. The tax breaks which
were implemented in 1973 and eliminated (or at least severely restricted) in 1986 were
designed to encourage investment in farming, real estate, motion pictures, and oil and gas.
Instead, they siphoned off capital from productive investments into tax avoidance schemes
that frequently crossed the line separating creative tax avoidance and outright tax fraud.
People invested money in chinchilla farms, jojoba bean plantations, desert real estate,
buffalo ranches, movies that would never be seen by a paying audience, hollow office
buildings, and dry oil wells. Many taxpayers lost not only their investment, but the value
of the deduction and more when the IRS disallowed their claim, slapping them with back
taxes and penalties. Some schemes such as a plan to purchase bibles at a discount and
then deduct them at several times their retail value after donating them to missionaries
resulted in jail time for the perpetrators. The point is that people will take extreme
measures to reduce their taxes, and thus it requires little imagination to believe that savers
would make limit contributions for the sole purpose of reducing their taxes by the
maximum amount allowed by law. (Graetz, 1997.)
Additionally, $2,000 is a reasonable annual savings target, and is well within reach
for most households that save. Also, people like to deal in round numbers. The author
believes that these factors will induce savers to contribute to the limit, even though their
ideal allocation of saving to retirement might be lower than $2,000.
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Another flaw with the limit contribution theory is it assumes all saving is identical.
It holds that a person whose ideal level of total savings is $10,000 will increase retirement
saving in response to the higher rate of return, but reduce other saving so that net saving
remains at $10,000. However, Richard Thaler's work on mental accounting suggests that
people compartmentalize their saving and do not treat money fUngibly. If this is the case,
then the marginal incentive to save in an IRA may encourage people to increase retirement
saving without reducing other saving. (Hubbard and Skinner, 1996) and (Venti and Wise,
1992)
Steven Venti and David Wise discount the claim that only the marginal incentive
matters by comparing contributor participation in front-loaded and back-loaded IRAs.
U.S. "front-loaded" IRAs allow immediate deductibility of contributions, but tax all
withdrawals as regular income. The United Kingdom's "back-loaded" Personal Equity
Plan (PEP) allows after tax contributions, but levies no taxes on withdrawals. If the tax
rate during the contribution and withdrawal periods is the same then there is no difference
in the rate of return between the two plans. However, the U.S. plan, with its immediate
tax deduction, has been much more effective in attracting contributions than the UK's
back-loaded plan, indicating some factor other than the rate of return can affect saving
behavior.
The response of households to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated
contribution deductibility for households with employer-provided pensions and incomes
over certain thresholds, is also inconsistent with the claim that only the marginal rate of
return matters. Although the up-front deduction was eliminated for some tax payers, tax-
deferred compounding was still available for everyone. Despite the fact that IRAs still
offered a higher rate of return, the number of households making contributions declined
dramatically after 1986. In fact, while the deduction was completely eliminated for only
15 percent of the contributors in 1985 and partially eliminated for another 12 percent, the
dollar value of deductions dropped by 63 percent, and the number of tax returns claiming
IRA contributions fell approximately 57 percent from 1986 to 1987 (EBRI, 1986.) This
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reaction suggests that IRA saving behavior was affected by the immediate tax break in
addition to the rate of return. (Venti and Wise, 1992.) Apparently the saving decisions of
many households are not consistent with the calculating rationality that the marginal rate
of return assumption implies.
3. Funding IRA Contributions With Home Equity
Households may engage in a more subtle form of asset shifting by decreasing home
equity while increasing IRA assets. To the extent that this occurs, IRAs do not increase
net wealth, but only change the composition of household wealth.
Engen, Gale, and Scholz contend that the failure to include home equity in the
measurement of household wealth overstates the importance of IRAs in net wealth,
underestimates prior saving behavior, and biases research in favor of finding that IRAs
increase saving. They claim that the traditional measure of wealth in terms of financial
assets dramatically understates the total assets of most households. In 1983, IRA
contributors had a median value of financial assets of $12,075, but a median value of
financial assets plus housing equity of $51,220. This higher measure of wealth
compromises the claim that households did little saving prior to 1983 and shows that
excluding home equity from wealth ignores household saving in the form of
downpayments and the repayment of mortgage principal. The larger value of financial
assets plus housing equity also casts doubt on the assumption that contributors did not
have sufficient assets in 1983 to fund the growth in IRA assets during subsequent years.
(Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1996a.)
According to Engen, Gale, and Sholz, (1996a, and 1996b) IRAs can plausibly
substitute for housing equity because both are long term, illiquid saving vehicles.
Substitution can occur in several ways. Households can extract equity while refinancing
their homes, take out home-equity lines of credit, or redirect money into IRAs that would
otherwise have been used to accelerate mortgage payments. Engen, Gale, and Sholz also
consider the decision to save in IRAs instead of buying a larger home to be a form of
59
substitution. The author disagrees with this contention, and believes instead that such a
decision is foregone consumption, not redirected saving.
Lawrence Kotlikoff (1992) suggests that IRA contributors engage in tax arbitrage
by borrowing money against home equity, the interest on which is tax-deductible, to
finance tax-advantaged contributions to IRAs. Such machinations yield a tax windfall for
households, without increasing net private savings, while simultaneously reducing net
national savings if the reduction in personal income tax revenue is financed with more
government debt. Although the arbitrage theory is plausible, Kotlikoff readily admits that
he has no empirical evidence that it occurs.
Engen and Gale find evidence that contributors did shift wealth from housing
equity to IRA assets. Between 1987 and 1991, households with IRAs substantially
increased their financial assets, but net wealth was unchanged because mortgage debt rose
more quickly (Engen, Gale, and Scholz 1996a.) However, they also present evidence that
contradicts this finding. Examining data from the 1986 SCF they found that between 1983
and 1986, median financial assets of IRA holders increased from $10,200 to $21,500 in
nominal dollars. During this same period, median housing equity for the group increased
from $39,398 to $45,169. Adjusting for inflation, median housing equity rose 4.2 percent
while median financial assets rose 92 percent. Thus, their own findings discredit the claim
that IRA holders financed contributions by reducing home equity. Unfortunately for the
strength of their case against new saving, they neither recognize nor address the disparity.
Lower housing equity does not mean that ERA contributions were financed with
mortgage debt, according to Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996), who argue that the decline
was caused by lower home prices in the late 1980s. Mortgage debt increased in response
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated the deduction for interest paid on
consumer debt, encouraging people to transfer debt from credit cards and signature loans
to tax-advantaged borrowing like home equity lines of credit. They fail to find evidence
that changes in mortgage debt were directly related to changes in IRA assets; in fact they
found the opposite to be true. Mortgage debt fell during the early 1980s while ERA
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contributions and balances rose rapidly, then increased as IRA contributions declined after
the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Other economists who have studied the relationship between home equity and
other assets also found little correlation between them. Although the tax arbitrage theory
sounds very plausible, not much empirical evidence has been presented to support it. It
also assumes that households treat housing equity and financial assets as fungible, which
may not be valid. The author concludes that while some households may finance IRA
contributions by borrowing against home equity, the net effect of this behavior is not
large. Households may use this tactic to make the annual contribution in some years when
cash is short, but it probably does not occur over the long term within a given household.
4. The Psychological Effects of IRAs
Much of the research on the impact of IRAs on saving behavior and net wealth is
based on the assumption that individuals behave rationally, make return-maximizing
decisions, and allocate total income over their lifetime based on sound estimates of
consumption needs during the retirement and pre-retirement periods. Ample evidence
suggests this assumption may not apply to some, or even most people. Recognizing this
possibility, several economists have focused on the psychological effects of IRAs on
individual decisions and saving behavior to assess the impact of these tax-deferred savings
vehicles.
Richard Thaler (1992) argues that households are not perfectly rational decision
makers, but are instead, imperfect creatures who struggle to exercise the self-control
required for disciplined saving. Saving money requires that people identify a future need
and exercise the self control to forego immediate gratification through consumption.
IRAs help people accomplish both; highlighting the need to save for retirement and
reinforcing the self-discipline required to deposit and retain money in retirement accounts.
Banks and other financial institutions aggressively advertised IRAs during the early
1980s, significantly increasing awareness of the need to save for retirement. Promotional
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efforts may have increased contributions by emphasizing the need while simultaneously
providing a vehicle in which to save for retirement. Many advertisements appealed to
bargain-seeking behavior by highlighting the superior rate of return afforded by tax-
deferred compounding. Multi-color graphs showing ERA balances rising steeply higher
than traditional savings account balances were a ubiquitous feature in marketing literature.
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that promotion played a significant
role in attracting ERA contributions. Between 1981 and 1986, anyone with income could
make tax-deductible contributions to ERAs, and banks actively courted this market.
During this period, the number of tax returns with ERA contributions grew from three
million in 1981 to 16 million in 1986; annual contributions increased from $5 billion to
$39 billion during the same period. When the Tax Reform Act of 1986 restricted the
number of households eligible to deduct contributions, marketing of ERAs by financial
institutions fell off precipitously. By 1987 only seven million households made ERA
contributions totaling $14 billion. Even though the change eliminated the deduction for
only 15 percent of contributors and partially eliminated it for another 12 percent,
deductions dropped by 63 percent. The decline in advertising of ERAs along with the
misunderstanding on the part of many households that they were no longer eligible to
contribute explains much of this overreaction. (Venti and Wise, 1992.)
If people designate different modes of saving for distinct purposes, in effect
treating them as distinct goods, then successful promotions of ERAs may have magnified
or created a distinction between them and other forms of saving. To the extent that
advertising emphasized such distinctions, it reduced the substitution of ERAs for other
forms of saving.
The structure of tax-deferred savings accounts has a psychological affect which
encourages real people to make contributions. Two features of ERAs encourage saving
for retirement. First, the accounts offer an immediate reward in the form of a tax
deduction, and second, they put the money off limits by penalizing premature withdrawals.
The ten percent penalty on withdrawals prior to age 59 1/2 is particularly important in
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reinforcing self-discipline since it imposes both economic and psychological costs on
backsliding. (Thaler, 1992.)
The timing of ERA contributions within the year highlights the importance of the
tax deduction for household saving decisions. Feenberg and Skinner (1989) point out that
approximately 40 percent of IRA contributions for a given year are made during the
following calendar year, prior to the tax-filing deadline. They conclude that many
households would rather deposit money in ERAs than write a check to the IRS. Eleventh
hour contributions, which miss out on 1 6 months of tax-deferred compounding, indicate
that the tax deduction may be a more significant factor than the rate of return in
motivating the contributions.
Skeptics agree that evidence on the psychological impact of IRAs may indicate
people are affected by factors other than the marginal rate of return, but counter that such
evidence does not prove IRA contributions are new saving. April 14th contributions
increase saving if households skip the summer vacation to raise the cash, but do not affect
net wealth (aside from the tax reduction) if the funds are transferred from the existing
assets. Additionally, the success of aggressive ERA marketing efforts in attracting
contributions, may reflect changes in asset composition rather than asset magnitude. (Gale
and Scholz, 1992.)
The author concludes that the psychological aspects of ERAs significantly affect
household saving decisions. The evidence that the upfront tax-deduction and early
withdrawal penalty motivates households to make and retain ERA contributions seems
quite compelling. Aggressive promotion not only attracted many contributions, but
differentiated ERAs from traditional saving accounts, further undermining the theory that
people treat them as substitutes. Finally, the evidence on the timing of contributions
rebuts the assumption that the marginal incentive to save and the rate of return are the
only criteria that matter for saving decisions.
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D. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF IRAS ON SAVING
Since the theoretical arguments failed to settle the disagreement over the
magnitude and direction of the affect of IRAs on net national saving, economists have
turned to empirical methods for answers. Using various survey data, they have tried to
measure the change in saving that can be attributed to ERAs. This is a difficult task.
Positive account balances do not prove that ERAs induce new saving, since balances will
increase whether the contributions come from foregone consumption or shifting existing
assets. To determine the effect of ERAs on saving behavior, economists must determine
how contributors would behave in the absence of ERAs. It is misleading to compare the
assets of contributors to the assets of people without ERAs because the difference in
capital accumulation can be explained by different saving preferences between the two
groups. ERA ownership indicates a preference for saving, and savers accumulate more
assets in all forms relative to non-savers. Using the assets of households without ERAs to
infer the behavior of the entire population in the absence of the accounts will bias the
results in favor of finding new savings (Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1996a.)
However, dividing the population into contributors and non-contributors, then
examining their behavior at given points in time also presents problems since membership
in either group is not fixed over time. Migration of households between groups alters the
aggregate savings behavior within each group over time. Thus, there is some advantage
to examining the behavior of the population without regard to contributor status (Poterba,
Venti, and Wise, 1996.)
Because of these complexities, researchers use various approaches to evaluate the
change in savings behavior caused by ERAs. They may follow the same individual or
household over time, analyzing changes between periods. They can compare the behavior
or assets of two or more groups at a particular point in time, while controlling for a certain
trait or demographic feature. They can also compare data on groups that reach the same
age during different calendar years to evaluate a change over time while controlling for
age. Economists use data from several sources to support their arguments. Not
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surprisingly, data from the same source is frequently used to both support and attack a
particular theory. Economists have used data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), and the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), among others, to bolster their cases. This section summarizes the
arguments based on this empirical evidence.
1. The Change in Saving Behavior
To support their contention that IRAs motivated additional saving, Poterba, Venti,
and Wise compare the assets of households before IRAs to their assets afterward. They
take data from 1 980, the period before IRAs were available to most people, and compare
it to data from 1986, when ERAs had been widely available for four years. They control
for differences in savings behavior by restricting the 1980 sample to "contributor-like"
households.
Venti and Wise used the following procedure to develop the mean financial assets
of the contributor-like households. Hypothetical figures are used to illustrate the process.
First, they divided the households in the 1986 Survey of Income and Program
Participation into 16 age-income categories. Then they counted the number of respondent
households within each category that contributed to IRAs in 1986 and calculated the mean
finacial assets of the contributing households. Assume for example that 30 percent of the
households in the 1986 SIPP aged 55 to 65 earning $30,000 to $39,999 contributed to
IRAs, and the mean financial assets of these contributors was $10,000. They believed that
they could use the percentage of contributing households to predict the percentage of
households within each age-income category that would have contributed to IRAs in an
earlier year. Thus, they randomly selected 30 percent of the households who fell in this
same age-income category in the 1980 SIPP. This process was repeated for each age-
income category to develop the contributor-like group for 1980.
Venti and Wise realized that a selectivity bias affected the value of the mean
financial assets of the observed contributors to IRAs. Those households that actually
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contributed to IRAs have a preference for saving, and tended to save more money in all
forms than households that did not contribute to ERAs. Since a random sample of an
equal proportion of households from the same age-income category would undoubtedly
select some households that did not contibute to ERAs, they expected the mean financial
assets of the predicted group of contributor-like households to be lower than that of the
observed group. To determine the magnitude of the relationship between the financial
assets of the predicted IRA contributors to the actual IRA contributors, they randomly
selected an equal proportion of households from the same age-income category from the
1986 SEPP and measured their mean financial assets. Using our example again, assume 30
percent of the households in the 1986 SEPP aged 55 to 65 earning $30,000 to $39,999
contributed to ERAs. By randomly selected 30 percent of the households in the 1986 SEPP
from this same age-income category, Venti and Wise developed the predicted group of
ERA contributors, then they calculated the mean financial assets for the predicted group.
Assume they found the predicted group had $5,000 in financial assets per household,
compared to $10,000 per household for the actual contributors. This meant that there was
a two-to-one ratio of mean financial assets for the actual ERA contributors to the predicted
IRA contributors within this age-income category.
Venti and Wise used the percentages for each age-income group to develop the
predicted contributors from the 1980 SEPP, then applied the ratio of the assets of observed
Contibutors to predicted contributors to adjust for the individual saving effect described
above. Continuing our example, they randomly selected 30 percent of the households in
the 1980 SEPP aged 55 to 65 with incomes (adjusted for inflation) between $30,000 and
$39,999, and calculated the mean financial assets for this group. Then they applied the
ratio of observed contributor assets to predicted contributor assets to correct for the
selectivity bias. Assume that the predicted group in 1980 had mean financial assets of
$1,500. Applying the ratio, the adjusted mean financial assets of the contributor-like
group would be $3,000. This process was completed for all 16 age-income categories to
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determine the mean financial assets for the entire contributor-like group in the 1980 SIPP.
(Venti and Wise, 1992.)
By comparing the assets of people with IRAs in 1986 to the assets of people who
they predict would have owned ERAs in 1980 if they had been available, Poterba, Venti,
and Wise hoped to reveal the effect of IRAs on savings behavior. Table 4.1 shows the
results.
Table 4 1 Financial Assets of "Contributor Like" Groups, 1980 and 1986
(Excluding Stocks and Bonds)
Contributor Status and Asset Respondents In Respondents In Percentage
1980 1986 Change
Contributor-Like
Non-IRA assets 4,635 7,816 68.6
IRA assets 7,800 —
Total assets 4,635 17,900 286.2
Non-Contributor-Like
Total assets 508 752 48.0
Source: Venti and Wise (1992, p. 19.)
Comparing the assets of contributor-like households between the two periods
indicates a change in saving behavior. In 1980, median non-IRA financial assets of
contributor-like households were $4,635; median IRA assets were near zero. By 1986,
median ERA assets rose to $7,800 and non-ERA financial assets rose to $7,816. Total
financial assets reached $17,900, a 286 percent increase over six years. Clearly, the
households in the sample saved much more after IRAs were introduced than before. Two
findings discredit the argument that IRA contributions were funded by shifting assets from
existing accounts. First, the difference in ERA account balances between 1980 and 1986
was greater than the median assets held by contributor-like respondents in 1980, indicating
contributors possessed insufficient assets in 1980 to fund actual contributions between
1982 and 1986. Second, non-ERA financial assets did not fall during this period, as the
shifting theory predicts. In fact, they rose by 68.6 percent. If contributors were shifting
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assets, account balances should have decreased as ERA balances increased. (Venti and
Wise, 1992.)
Venti and Wise discount some other explanations for the growth of assets during
this period. They point out that nominal income growth of 48 percent does not explain
the rise in financial assets among IRA contributors, but add that it does explain the growth
in assets of non-contributors. They also contend that most savers do not hold their
financial assets in stocks, so stock market growth is not a explanation for the increase.
Including stocks and bonds in the calculations yields slightly lower asset growth rates than
shown in Table 4.1, which excludes them.
Engen, Gale, and Scholz challenge the Venti and Wise findings on the following
grounds. Financial assets alone are inadequate measures of wealth. Contributors held
substantial amounts of housing equity, which, when included, result in much higher values
of median wealth. Using data from the 1983 and 1986 SCF (also used by Venti and Wise
to support their findings above) the median value of net financial assets plus home equity
was $51,220 for IRA contributors in 1983 and grew to $64,897 by 1986, contradicting the
claim that these families did little saving before ERAs were introduced. (Engen, Gale, and
Scholz, 1996a.)
Engen, Gale, and Scholz offer the following explanation for the increase in net
wealth. The initial wealth level would plausibly have grown by 6 percent per year in
nominal terms from 1983 to 1986. This alone would have resulted in median 1986 wealth
of $61,000. If the median family had made additional contributions of $1,200 per year
(plus accumulated interest), it would have attained the actual median 1986 wealth level. If
a conservative 20 percent tax rate adjustment is made for the fact that $6,000 of the 1986
wealth was accumulated with tax deductible ERAs, new saving of less than $900 per year
would have been sufficient to generate the 1986 wealth level. (Engen, Gale, and Scholz,
1996a, p. 32-33.)
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They conclude it is plausible to assume annual savings of $900 would have
occurred anyway since the median IRA contributor was 42 in 1983 and had financial
assets plus housing equity of $5 1,220. 13
2. Cohort Analysis
To support the conclusion that IRAs induce new saving, Venti and Wise (1996)
offer the following hypothesis: If IRAs increase saving, then a household with more time
to contribute money to one will accumulate greater retirement savings and net financial
assets relative to an identical household with less time to contribute. If IRAs do not
stimulate saving, then increased exposure to IRAs should not affect the level of household
wealth. This theory can be tested by comparing the retirement assets of two people who
reach the same age in different calendar years. For example, a person who is 50 years old
in 1984 had two years to save money in an IRA before his 50th birthday, assuming he
could not contribute to one until they became widely available in 1982. A person aged 50
in 1987 had five years to contribute to an IRA before his 50th birthday. If IRAs do
stimulate new saving, then the 50 year old in 1987 should have more in total financial
assets than the 50 year old in 1984.
Rather than compare the assets of two individuals, Venti and Wise measure the mean
assets of random samples of respondents to the Survey of Income and Program
Participation. They use cohorts 14 of people in a five-year age window in a given year,
comparing the mean retirement assets (IRA plus 401(k) balances) of people who were in a
given age range in one year to the mean retirement assets of a random sample of people
who were in this same age range, but in a different year. They develop cohorts of sample
respondents in 1 5 separate five-year age ranges and calculate the mean retirement assets of
1
3
Included in this broader measure of wealth are the cash value of life insurance, trusts, managed
investment accounts, and land contracts. Poterba, Venti, and Wise contend that the broader measure is
overstated, because these assets are highly unlikely sources for IRA contributions.
14 A cohort is defined as a group of people born in the same year or range of years. A cohort can also be
all the people of the same age in a given year.
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each cohort for each year from 1984 to 1991. A subset of these cohorts and mean assets
is shown in Table 4.2. The columns show the results for a subset of the cohorts for 1984,
1986, and 1990. Each cell shows the age range of a particular cohort in the designated
year, along with the mean retirement assets for the cohort in that year. The increase in
retirement savings, which Venti and Wise believe are caused by longer periods of IRA
eligibility, is shown by comparing the value of mean retirement savings for a cohort that
reached a given age range in year, along with the mean retirement assets for the cohort in
that year. The one year to another cohort that reached the same age range in a later year.
For example compare the two cells shown in bold in Table 4.2.
The cell in the column on the left shows the mean retirement assets for the cohort
that reached ages 54 to 58 in 1984. These people had approximately two years to save
money in ERAs and 401(k)s before reaching this age. The cohort that reached this age in
1990, shown in the column on the right, had approximately eight years to save money in
ERAs and 401(k)s, and accumulated almost $10,000 more in retirement savings.
Venti and Wise feel they adequately control for any unobserved heterogeneity
between the comparison groups, since the cohorts are random samples of SIPP
respondents in each year, rather than the same individuals or households examined over
several years. Since the sample of 58 to 62 year olds in 1984 was randomly selected, it is
unlikely that they differ in some systematic way from the randomly selected sample of 58
to 62 year olds in 1991. In examining their findings, they also restrict comparison to
households with the same income, marital status, and education.
Venti and Wise believe that the cohorts developed in this manner are similar in all
respects except for the length of time they had to contribute to IRAs (Venti and Wise,
1996). If this assumption is valid, and if IRAs effectively raise savings, then a cohort that
reaches a specified age in an earlier calendar year will have saved less money than a cohort
that reaches the same age in a later calendar year due to shorter exposure to ERAs. For
example, the cohort aged 60 to 64 in 1984 had two years to accumulate assets in IRAs
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Table 4.2 Selected Cohorts and Mean Retirement Savings : 1984, 1986, 1990
Cohort Designator Age and Mean Retirement Assets In:
1984 1986 1990
C42 40-44 42-46 46-50
$1,509 $4,343 $10,369
C46 44-48 46-50 50-54
$1,825 $4,528 $11,694
3C50 48-52 50-54 54-58
$1,983 $5,740 $12,030
C56 54-58 56-60 60-64
$2,849 $6,702 $15,130
C60 58-62 60-64 64-68
$4,275 $8,108 $10,820
C62 60-64 62-66 66-70
$4,272 $8,467 $10,612
C66 64-68 66-70 70-74
$3,262 $6,328 $7,565
C70 68-72 70-74 74-78
$1,608 $2,036 $3,204
Adapted from (Venti and Wise, 1996)
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before they reached the specified age, while the cohort aged 60 to 64 in 1987 had five
years, and the cohort that reached this age in 1991 had nine years. They find that families
reaching a specified age in later calendar years had larger assets than families reaching that
age in earlier calendar and conclude that IRAs result in new saving. For example, the cells
in bold in Table 4.2 show the dramatic difference between financial assets of the cohort
that reached age 54 to 58 in 1984 and the cohort that reached the same age in 1990.
The results for the 60-to-64 year-old cohort analysis are shown in Table 4.3. It
compares the assets of sample households that reached ages 60 to 64 in 1 984 to the assets
of sample households that reached this age range in 1991 . The households with nine years
to contribute to IRAs or 401(k)s by age 60 to 64 accumulated significantly higher
retirement and total assets than the households with only two years to contribute. The
difference in total financial assets between the two cohorts is accounted for by the
difference in retirement assets. The slightly lower value of non-retirement assets for the
1991 cohort demonstrates two things. First, non-retirement assets did not decline enough
to offset the growth in retirement assets, indicating the younger cohorts did not finance
their retirement savings by shifting assets. Second, whatever caused the large difference in
retirement savings between the two cohorts did not similarly affect non-retirement savings.
Table 4.3 Comparison of Retirement and Financial Assets of the Age 60 to 64
Cohort (In 1991 dollars)
Households Aged 60 - 64 in Year: 1984 1991 Difference
Households with IRAs or 401(k)s a
Retirement Assets 8,171 22,148 13,977
Other Financial Assets 22,983 21,528 -1,455
Total Financial Assets 34,975 50,182 15,207
Households without IRAs or 401(k)s b
Total Financial Assets 2,687 2,134 -533
All 1 j sen olds
h
Reti; ement Assets 5,118 14,156 9,038
Other Financial Assets 37,132 36,263 -869
Total Financial Assets 42,250 50,419 8,169




Whether we examine all households, or only those households with IRAs or
401(k)s, the lesson remains the same. The cohorts with longer exposure to tax-deferred
retirement saving vehicles accumulated more financial assets than the cohorts with shorter
exposure. When median asset levels are evaluated for all households regardless of IRA
ownership, the difference in total assets is entirely accounted for by the increase in
retirement assets.
Figure 4.2 graphically displays the difference in retirement savings for several other
cohorts reaching a specified age in the year indicated. For each pair, the column on the
left shows the level of retirement savings for the cohort with that median age in 1984. The
column on the right shows the retirement savings for the cohort reaching the same age in
1991. The younger cohorts, with seven more years to accumulate assets in retirement
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Figure 4.2 Comparison of Retirement Savings Between Cohorts; 1984 and 1991
Source: After Venti, and Wise (1996)
Venti, and Wise (1996) refer to the difference in assets of cohorts reaching the
same age in different calendar years as "cohort effects." They note there is no similar
cohort effect observed among non-retirement financial assets of the cohorts. The cohort
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aged 66 to 72 in 1 984 had the lowest level of retirement savings, which is expected since
this group was already past the normal retirement age in 1982 and had little opportunity to
save money in tax-deferred retirement-savings vehicles.
The data above show the cohort effects of IRAs and 401(k)s combined, but
Poterba, Venti, and Wise ( 1 996) also demonstrate that the conclusions are valid for IRAs
alone. Comparing the assets from demographically similar households with IRAs who
were not eligible for 401(k)s, they found median financial assets grew from $20,686 in
1984 to $27,094 in 1991. During this same period non-IRA assets were relatively
constant, rising from $13,309 in 1984 to $13,335 in 1991.
The evidence on the changing assets of cohorts as the period of IRA eligibility
increases supports the theory that IRAs stimulate new savings. Among demographically
and statistically similar groups, there was a marked rise in total financial assets, caused by
growth in retirement savings, as IRA exposure increased. The evidence fails to support
the shifting theory since no offsetting reduction in non-IRA financial assets was observed.
Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996b) contend that cohort analysis is based on the
heroic assumption that the only difference between the various cohorts was the length of
time they had to contribute money to IRAs. They argue that there are several other key
differences between the cohorts such as the stock market boom, higher real interest rates,
shifts in non-financial assets, higher debt, bias caused by comparing pre-tax balances to
post-tax balances, and omitted 401(k) and thrift savings plan data, provide plausible
explanations for the growth in financial assets observed by Poterba, Venti, and Wise.
Referring to Table 4.3, Engen, Gale and Scholz argue that much of the $8,169
difference in mean financial assets between all households in the two cohorts can be
explained by the difference in stock market returns that each cohort experienced.
Consider the two cohorts shown in Table 4.1. Since seven years separate the two cohorts,
it is appropriate to compare stock market appreciation during the seven years before each
cohort reached the specified age. During the seven years before the older cohort reached
60 to 64 (1977 to 1984) the Standard and Poor's 500 Index declined five percent. During
the seven years that preceded the younger cohorts attainment of the same age (1984 to
1991), the index rose 78 percent. Engen, Gale and Scholz calculate the mean 1984 stock
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and mutual fund holdings of the younger cohort in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts
at $7150. An increase of 78 percent would raise the value to $12,727 in 1991. If they
experienced the same five percent decrease over seven years as the older cohort, their
stock would instead be worth $6,800 in 1991 15 , a difference of $5,927. This accounts for
72 percent of the difference in financial assets between the two cohorts. (Engen, Gale,
and Scholz, 1996b. p. 122-123.)
Another explanation for the apparent increase in financial assets is supplied by the
decrease in both interest rates and marginal tax rates during the period. The decline in
interest rates reduced mortgage costs, freeing up more money for investing. The decline
in marginal tax rates made it less expensive to hold assets in taxable form. This
environment encouraged people to shift equity from tangible assets like homes to financial
assets, and contributed to the apparent increase in saving. (Engen, Gale, and Scholz,
1996b.) They also argue that an increase in home equity and consumer debt offset the
increase in financial assets.
The tax-deferred status of retirement savings confounds the comparison of
balances in IRAs to balances in taxable saving accounts. ERA balances are pretax amounts
and must be reduced by the tax rate before they can be accurately compared to taxable
account balances, which are post-tax. Again, refer to Table 4.3. The $9,000 increase in
retirement savings vehicles between 1984 and 1991 does not mean the younger cohort had
to save $9,000 more than the older cohort. Some of this balance represents deferred taxes
on gains and contributions. Using a marginal tax rate of 28 percent, yields a $6,480
increase net of taxes. Subtracting the postponed taxes reduces the apparent impact of tax-
deferred retirement accounts on saving. (Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1996b.)
Finally, they contend that the SEPP data used by Poterba, Venti, and Wise are
biased in favor of new savings due to excluded data. The SD?P data for 1984 did not
include 401(k) balances, nor did it include balances in employer-sponsored thrift-savings
plans that were later transferred to 401(k) accounts. Since the SIPP data for 1991
15 All figures are 1991 dollars.
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includes these balances, the difference will appear to be new saving. Poterba, Venti, and
Wise counter that this bias is negligible since the 1984 balances for 401 (k)s were minimal.
The author believes that the downward adjustments made by Engen, Gale, and
Scholz are overstated for a few reasons. First, citing a rise in consumer debt as proof of
asset shifting is a tenuous claim. Rising consumer debt does not prove that ERA owners
borrowed money to make annual contributions. Over the past decade, banks have been
more willing to extend credit to more people. Credit card companies have dramatically
expanded their client base, while lowering their qualification standards. Consumer debt
has risen because consumer credit is more widely available, not because savers are
charging their annual ERA contribution to their MasterCard™. Second, while the
difference in the post-tax value ofERA balances certainly requires a downward adjustment,
discounting the entire balance may be overstated. Some portion of ERA assets come from
non-deductible contributions which are post-tax amounts. Although these amounts are
probably small, including them in the tax adjustment will understate the post-tax value of
ERA balances.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Poterba, Venti, and Wise provide convincing evidence that ERAs increase saving
and net wealth. Their research demonstrates that as ERA balances increase, non-ERA
financial assets do not decrease by an offsetting amount. By showing that the amount of
money accumulated in ERAs exceeds the pre-existing saving of most savers, they
effectively discredit the argument that ERA contributions were funded by transferring
money that had already been saved. Their work with cohort analysis is interesting, and
does suggest that increased exposure to ERAs leads to higher saving and net wealth. The
assumptions on which cohort analysis are based are not particularly robust, leaving their
conclusions subject to challenge.
Engen, Gale, and Sholz mount several convincing challenges to the claims of new
saving, and their findings suggest that the optimistic estimates of new saving require some
downward adjustment. In particular, their argument that the difference in the savings of
cohorts can be explained by factors other than the length of ERA exposure, demands some
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reduction in the magnitude of the cohort effects. Still, they overcompensate for these
other factors. Including home equity in the measurement of net wealth shows that
households saved more money than Poterba, Venti, and Wise estimated using financial
wealth only, but since little evidence suggests that households substituted home equity for
IRA saving, the larger measure of net wealth will not affect the conclusion that ERAs
increased saving.
The argument that IRAs are effective substitutes for other saving vehicles is
unconvincing, lending credence to the claim that IRAs stimulate new saving. The people
on whom the perfect substitutability theory are based behave in a perfectly rational
manner, responding only to marginal incentives, and striving only to maximize their rate of
return. The model leaves no room for the less rational behavior of real people. Several
anomalies, such as the significant number of savers without IRAs for whom the accounts
should be perfect substitutes for other saving, also undermine the theory.
The author concludes that the basic claim forwarded by Poterba, Venti, and Wise
is correct: ERAs increase private saving. However, the estimate that 50 to 60 percent of
contributions are new savings seems overstated. The author agrees with the more
moderate estimates of a 26 percent new saving, and eschews the pessimistic estimate that
ERAs reduce or fail to increase saving.
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V. THE COST OF IRA DEDUCTIBILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
In this thesis the author proposes allowing service members to deduct their
Individual Retirement Account contributions, regardless of their income. Chapter III
demonstrated that despite their similar treatment by the Internal Revenue Code with
regard to IRA deduction rules, military retirement differs markedly from qualified civilian
retirement plans that receive favorable tax treatment. The author argues that extending
universal IRA deductibility to all service members is one way of alleviating the inequity of
similar tax treatment of retirement plans that offer vastly different protections for worker
benefits. While Chapter II described the legislative and institutional obstacles to changing
military retirement, this chapter describes another potential impediment to the proposed
change: the cost of the proposal. By estimating the cost of the proposal, and putting it in
perspective, the following discussion shows that cost is not a valid barrier to redressing
the inequity of military retirement system by amending the Internal Revenue Code to allow
all service members to deduct their IRA contributions.
Expanding the deductibility of Individual Retirement Account contributions will
reduce federal personal income tax revenues by approximately $30 million annually. Over
longer periods, the total revenue loss is much less than the sum of annual revenue losses
because it is offset by increasing corporate income tax revenues, and increasing personal
income tax revenues during retirement. The subsequent sections of the chapter describe
the method used to arrive at this estimate.
B. THE ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL INCOME TAX REVENUE LOSS
Allowing all service members to deduct their IRA contributions regardless of their
income would reduce federal income tax revenues by increasing the number of people who
can to deduct their contributions from their taxable income. The estimate of the annual
revenue loss that would result from extending universal deductibility to active-duty
personnel is based on a study of the 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) performed by
79
the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) that calculated IRA participation rates
and contributions by income, age, and other demographic characteristics. The estimate
described in this chapter uses their findings on the relationship between IRA participation
and income to predict IRA participation among military personnel. The study divided the
population into two groups: workers covered by an employer-sponsored retirement plan
and workers not covered by any such plan. Since workers not covered by a qualified
employer-sponsored pension plan can deduct their IRA contributions from taxable income
regardless of their income level, the participation rates among these uncovered workers is
a good predictor of ERA participation among military personnel if they were eligible to
deduct their contributions.
Using a seven-step estimating procedure described below, the author concludes
that the additional income-tax revenue loss caused by the proposal is $30 million annually.
In the first step of the estimating procedure the active duty population was divided into
eight groups according to the income categories used by EBRI. The second step was to
count the number of service members in each of these categories. Next, the IRA
participation rate for each group was multiplied by the number of personnel in that group,
then multiplied by the average annual contribution for that group to arrive at the total
annual IRA contribution per income group. The total contributions per group were then
multiplied by an estimated marginal tax rate for the group to derive the total income-tax
revenue loss per group. This loss was then adjusted to subtract the values of revenue lost
under current deduction rules, and revenue which would not be lost under the proposal
due to rules that restrict deductibility because of a spouse's retirement-plan coverage.
Finally, the adjusted losses per income group were summed to arrive at a total revenue
loss resulting from implementation of the proposal.
Table 5.1 shows the values used to arrive at the estimate and the following
sections explain the estimating methodology in detail by describing the contents and
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1. Annual Earnings
The population of active duty personnel is divided into eight groups by annual
income. In Issue Brief #153 from September 1994, the Employee Benefit Research
Institute used data from the April 1993 employee benefit supplement to the Current
Population Survey (CPS) to compute IRA participation rates and average contributions
within eight income groups. Column one labels each group for ease of exposition. For
example, the subsequent discussion refers to service members earning between $22,000
and $27,499 annually as Group V personnel. The income ranges used by EBRI were
based on 1993 dollars, so the categories shown in column two were indexed for wage
growth to 1997 values using the growth of military basic pay between 1993 and 1997.
2. Number of Service Members Per Earnings Group
Column three shows the number of service members in each income group based
on data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (see Table 5.2.) Income is
defined as basic pay, Basic Allowance for Quarters, Basic Allowance for Subsistence,
Variable Housing Allowance, Commuted Rations, and Special and Incentive pays.
Because cash payments are considered, in-kind compensation such as government housing
or messing is not included.
3. Participation Rates
Column four contains the IRA participation rate for each income group. According
to EBRI's findings, average participation was higher among workers who are covered by
an employer-sponsored retirement plan. IRA participation among all workers covered by
an employer's plan was 9.2 percent while participation among non-covered workers was
6.3 percent. The aggregate numbers are misleading, however. In the lowest four income
groups ($0 - $21,999), covered workers have a much higher participation rate than their
non-covered counterparts. IRA participation among non-covered workers roughly equals
that of covered workers in the Groups V and VI ($22,000 - $32,999). In Groups VII and
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VIII ($33,000 and up) the participation rate among non-covered workers exceeds that of
covered workers.
The finding that the average IRA participation rate is lower among workers not
covered by an employer plan is surprising. One would expect higher rates of participation
among non-covered workers since they are eligible to deduct their contributions,
regardless of how much money they earn. In Groups VII and VIII, the higher
participation rates among non-covered workers supports this expectation. The lower
participation rates among Groups I through IV suggests that other factors such as a
selectivity bias are at work. Coverage by employer-sponsored retirement plans is not
exogenous to the worker. Employers do not provide retirement plans without considering
the desires of their employees. They provide retirement plans because the after-tax value
of a dollar in retirement benefits is, for many employees, greater than the after-tax value of
an additional dollar in regular compensation. This is particularly true for high-income
workers in the top tax brackets who place a high value on compensation which is not
immediately taxed. Employers provide these plans because their workers prefer to receive
some portion of their compensation in retirement benefits. Workers themselves consider
the compensation package when choosing their employer. Workers who place a high
value on savings in general, and retirement savings in particular, are more likely to go to
work for an employer that provides a qualified retirement plan. (Engen, Gale, and Scholz,
1996a.)
If people who have a higher preference for saving are more likely to go to work
for an employer that provides a retirement plan, then the higher participation rates among
lower-income workers reflects a difference in the propensity to save between the two
groups, not a greater incentive for covered workers to participate in an IRA. This is
particularly true since covered workers in the lower income groups are eligible to deduct
their IRA contributions because they are below the income thresholds at which deduction
eligibility phases out. The after-tax incentive for workers in the 15-percent tax bracket to
contribute to an IRA is identical for covered and non-covered workers. Thus the lower
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IRA participation rates for non-covered people in the lower annual earnings group
indicates a selectivity bias and probably underestimates the actual participation rates
among military personnel in these income categories.
Despite this bias, and for several reasons, the estimate presented here uses the
participation rates for non-covered workers to predict IRA participation among service
members in the face of universal deduction eligibility. First, the author believes that
averaging the participation rates between covered and non-covered workers, or choosing
the highest (or lowest) rate per income group would be less accurate than using the rates
of one group for all personnel. Second, the purpose of this estimate is to predict the
revenue loss if all military personnel were eligible to deduct their IRA contributions.
While we can reasonably assume that all covered workers whose earnings place them in
the 15-percent tax bracket are eligible to deduct their contributions, we do not know this
for a fact. It is conceivable that other income which was not reported to the Current
Population Survey, or income from a working spouse might make them ineligible to
deduct their contributions. Since uncovered workers can deduct contributions regardless
of income, we know that they will be able to do so, regardless of other sources of income
which might place them in a higher tax bracket. Third, the participation rates among
lower income service members are ultimately irrelevant to the estimate of additional cost
resulting from the proposal. It makes no difference whether two percent or four percent
of service members in Group I contribute to IRAs. Since these service members can
already deduct their ERA contributions, the proposed reform would not cause any new
revenue loss. Finally, using the participation rates among non-covered workers applies the
highest percentage to the groups that do matter for the estimate of additional revenue loss:
those workers who are currently ineligible to deduct their contributions. Using the higher
estimate for participation means that the estimate is more likely to overestimate the cost to
the federal government than to underestimate it.
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4. Average Annual Contribution
Column five shows the average annual contribution per IRA contributor in each
income group. Originally computed by EBRI in 1993 dollars, the values were indexed for
wage growth using the growth in military basic pay between 1993 and 1997. Notice that
the average contribution for Groups I and II exceeds that for all other groups except
Groups VII and VIII. That the lowest earners contribute, on average, more money to
IRAs than most of their higher-wage counterparts is unexpected. The author believes the
explanation lies in demographics. Only 6.9 percent of workers surveyed in the CPS fell
into Group I and only 16.7 percent of workers fell into Group I and II combined. Some of
the lowest earners are retirees who have low current income, but high wealth. These
people have the incentive and the ability to make maximum annual contributions to IRAs
to shelter their post-retirement earnings from taxes. Thus the wealth of many IRA
contributors in the Groups I and II is probably greater than the wealth of active-duty
personnel in these groups. The average contribution for these groups probably
exaggerates the expected contribution level of the lowest-paid service members.
For reasons similar to those stated in the previous section, this anomaly does not
compromise the validity of the estimate. First, this error will overstate the total revenue
loss resulting from IRA deductions by service members and any bias it imposes will
disfavor the proposal. Second, the total expected contribution for Groups I and II is $5.6
million. At only 2.2 percent of the total expected contribution for all service members
($250 million), an error in the value of expected contributions among the lowest earners
will have little impact on the total cost of the program. Finally, the revenue loss caused by
the IRA contributions of the lowest two income groups occurs under the existing IRA
deduction rules, and would not be an additional cost arising from a rule change. Thus, any
discrepancy in the amount of contributions would not much affect the final estimate of
additional revenue loss resulting from the proposal.
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5. Total Service Member Contributions to IRAs
Column six is the expected value of the total annual contributions to IRAs by
service members. To calculate the value of total contributions per income group, multiply
the participation rate of that group by the number of service members, and then multiply
again by the average annual contribution per group. The value for each group is summed
to arrive at the estimate for total annual ERA contributions by military personnel. This
figure, shown in the bottom row of column six, is approximately $251 million.
6. Tax Brackets
Column seven contains the estimated marginal tax rate for each earnings group.
Several factors confound the effort to estimate marginal tax rates using total military pay.
First, reported service-member income does not include non-military sources such as
spousal income second jobs, investment income, or rental income. This omission
understates actual earnings. Second, some military compensation is paid in non-taxable
allowances, such as Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ), Basic Allowance for
Subsistence (BAS), and Variable Housing Allowance (VHA). Including these allowances
is essential to determining total income, but overstates taxable income. It is difficult, if not
impossible to compute the portion of pay that is not taxable since the allowance amounts
vary according to rank, geographic location, and actual housing expenses. Additionally,
some service members receive this compensation in the form of government-provided
housing and messing, and so their pay may be fully taxable. Calculating the value of
deductions and exemptions is also difficult. Data is available on the withholding status
claimed by service members, but it may not accurately reflect the actual deductions and
exemptions the service member can claim. The factors listed above are offsetting, but the
relative magnitude of each are unknown so it is difficult to determine in which direction
any adjustment to total income should be made.
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a. Assumptions
The researcher makes several assumptions in estimating the average
marginal tax rate per income group. One assumption is that unmarried personnel reduce
their total income by the standard unmarried deduction and one personal exemption.
Another assumption is that married personnel use the married deduction and two personal
exemptions. The researcher ignores the following possible exemption and deduction
variations to simplify the estimate:
• Single personnel may be heads of households and qualify for more exemptions
and have a higher tax-bracket threshold.
• Married personnel may have additional exemptions for dependent children.
• Personnel may have itemized deductions that exceed the standard deduction.
The data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, summarized in Table
5.2, categorizes personnel as either single and married according to their tax-withholding
status. While some personnel claiming single filing status are married, the author assumes
that withholding status indicates actual marital status. Assuming these personnel are in
fact single may underestimate their taxable income since married personnel withholding at
the single rate may have higher income that requires higher withholding
According to the Military Family Resource Center, 54 percent of spouses
of service members are employed in the civilian workforce. Therefore, the author assumes
that the percentage of all personnel in an income group who are married and have an
income-earning spouse is 54 percent of all married personnel in that group. Thus, if 50
percent of the personnel in an income group are married, then 27 percent of all personnel
in the group are assumed married to an income earning spouse, while 23 percent are
assumed married to a spouse who does not earn an income.
For Income Groups I through IV, the author assumes there are no
deductions for non-taxable allowances. Most service members in these groups are junior
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enlisted personnel who reside in the barracks and dine in the mess hall. Since they receive
subsistence and quarters in kind, most of their compensation will be taxable pay.
Regardless, the total pay for Groups I through IV is low enough that this assumption has
no effect on their tax bracket.
For income groups that straddle a tax bracket some assumptions are made
about non-taxable allowances, based on the likely ranks of personnel in those groups.
These assumptions are described where they are made.
In almost all cases where assumptions are made, the researcher used values
that result in a higher estimated income loss. Thus the final estimate of income tax
revenue loss caused by the proposal should be a worst case-scenario.
Table 5.3 shows the marginal tax bracket thresholds for 1997. It is
followed by a detailed description of how the researcher arrived at an average marginal tax
rate for each income group.
Table 5.3 1997 Income Tax Brackets
Marginal Tax Rate Upper Limit for Upper Limit for
Unmarried Workers Married Workers
15 percent $24,650 $41,200
28 percent $59,750 $99,600
31 percent $124,650 $151,750
36 percent $271,050 271,050
39 percent All income over $271,050 All income over $271,050
b. Income Groups I, II, and III
The 1 997 tax schedule imposes a 1 5 percent levy on taxable income up to
$24,650 for unmarried individuals. Thus, any single wage earner with taxable income
below this level faces a marginal tax rate of 1 5 percent. All unmarried service members in
Income Groups I, II, and III ($0 - $16,499) are in the 15 percent tax bracket. Even if all
their reported income is taxable, they are still well below the 28-percent tax bracket
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threshold. Assuming they can claim the standard deduction of $4,000 and one personal
exemption of $2,550, their income levels are sufficiently low that other sources of income
are extremely unlikely to put them in the 28-percent tax bracket.
Married individuals are taxed at 15-percent for all taxable income up to
$41,200. A married service member in Groups I through III whose spouse does not have
an independent source of income will be well below the 28-percent tax bracket. If we
assume that an income-earning spouse receives exactly the same pay as the service
member (doubling total income) the top-earning service members in Group III are still
approximately $7,000 below the $41,200 bracket margin. The assumption that wage-
earning military spouses make as much as the service member probably overstates
household income in most cases.
The author concludes that all service members in Income Groups I, II, and
III will be in the 1 5 percent tax bracket.
c. Income Group IV
The author believes that all single personnel and most married personnel
earr'^.g between $16,500 and $21,999 face a 15-percent marginal tax rate. The top wage
earner in Group IV earns about $3,000 less than the upper bracket limit for unmarried
taxpayers, and second sources of income would have to raise total income significantly to
offset the reductions from non-taxable income and the standard deduction and exemption.
Single-earner married personnel in this group also earn much less than $41,200 and are
taxed at 15 percent. Most married personnel with wage-earning spouses will still earn less
than the 15-percent bracket limit. Married personnel at the upper limit of Group IV
whose spouses earn equivalent wages will find themselves in the 28-percent tax bracket in
terms of total income, but subtracting the standard deduction for married individuals and
two personal exemptions reduces their taxable income by $11,800. Married personnel
earning $44,998 (twice the maximum total military pay in Group IV) would have $33,198
in taxable income assuming non-taxable allowances offset other sources of income like
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investment or rental income. Thus, even two-earner couples in income Group IV should
face a 15-percent marginal tax rate.
d Income Group V
Single personnel in Group V straddle the tax bracket in terms of total
income. However when $6,550 is subtracted for the standard deduction and exemption,
even the highest-paid single earners will be taxed at 15 percent. One-earner married
personnel are still solidly in the 15-percent tax bracket. The highest-paid married
personnel whose spouses earn identical incomes will have a total income of $54,998 and
taxable income of $43,198 when the standard deduction and two personal exemptions are
subtracted. Take away $7,000 for non-taxable allowances and many of the highest wage
earners will be in the 15-percent bracket 16 . Some personnel at the upper end of Group V
who have significant second sources of income or who receive allowances for quarters and
subsistence in kind may face a 28-percent marginal tax rate, but only a few personnel are
likely to fit this description. The vast majority of personnel in Group V are taxed at 15
percent.
e. Income Group VI
Maximum military pay for single-earner married couples in Group VI is
$32,999. Unless other sources of income exceeds their deductions, exemptions, and non-
taxable pay by $8,000, they will be taxed at 15 percent. Most unmarried personnel in
Group VI will also be taxed at 15 percent. The average total income for Group VI is
$29,548, which falls below the upper-bracket limit for unmarried individuals when $6,550
for the standard deduction and exemption is subtracted. (See Table 5.2 for the average
earnings per income group.) The maximum value of total earnings for single people in
Group VI, less the standard deduction and exemption is $26,449, which exceeds the upper
16 Group V is comprised of the newly commissioned officers and junior-to-mid-career staff
noncommissioned officers. A married O-l receives $5,796 in BAQ and $1,842 in BAS. A married E-6
receives $6,166 in BAQ and $2,610 in BAS.
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limit of the 15-percent bracket by $1,799. Depending on the relative magnitude of non-
taxable allowances and other sources of income some of the highest-paid single personnel
in Group VI may face a 28-percent tax rate for a small portion of their income. Assuming
non-taxable allowances of $7,000 17 leads the researcher to believe that relatively few
single earners in Group VI will have enough secondary income to push their taxable
income into the 28-percent tax bracket.
Married personnel with wage earning spouses may have taxable income in
the 28-percent tax bracket depending on the relative magnitude of non-taxable pay and
deductions from income and the amount spousal earnings or other sources of income. The
author assumes that half of all two-earner married couples in Group VI are taxed at the 1
5
percent marginal rate and half are taxed at the 28 percent marginal rate. This equates to
an average marginal tax rate of 21.5 percent for two-earner married personnel in Group
VI
The 17-percent average marginal tax rate for all Group VI personnel was
computed using Equation 5.1. The percentage of single personnel is multiplied by their
marginal tax rate, then added to the product of the percentage of one-earner married
personnel and their marginal tax rate, then added to the product of the percentage of two-
earner married personnel and their marginal tax rate.
(S-VI)*(MTR) + (M-VI)*(MTR) + (T-VI)*(MTR) = Average MTR-VI (5.1)
Where:
S-VI = percentage of single personnel in Group VI
M-VI = percentage of one-earner married personnel in Group VI
T-VT = percentage of two-earner married personnel in Group VI
MTR = Marginal Tax Rate
17 Group VI is comprised ofjunior officers and mid-career-to-senior staff non-commissioned officers.
BAQ and BAS for an unmarried 0-2 is $6,800 annually and $7,100 for an unmarried E-7.
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Table 5.4 shows the values for the above variables which result in the 17
percent average marginal tax rate for Group VI.
Table 5.4 Weighted Average Marginal Tax Rate for Group VI
Percentage Marginal Married Marginal Married Marginal Weighted
Single Tax Rate One Income Tax Rate Tvjo Incomes Tax Rate Average
48.8% 15% 23.5% 15% 27.6% 21.5% 17%
/ Income Group VII
Most personnel in Group VII face a 28-percent marginal tax rate. Single
personnel at the lowest end of the income range may have sufficient deductions from total
income to qualify for the 15-percent tax rate, but most will be over the bracket threshold.
Married personnel whose spouses earn income will generally face a 28-percent marginal
tax rate. Many single-earner married couples will have taxable income low enough to
qualify for the 15-percent tax rate since the average income among Group VII personnel is
$42,167, however, the highest paid single-earner married couples are taxed at 28 percent.
The author assumes that half of the single-earner married personnel in Group VII are
taxed at the 15-percent marginal rate, and half are taxed at 28 percent. Thus, the author
concludes that the average marginal tax rate for single-earner married personnel in Group
VII is 21.5 percent. The average marginal tax rate for all personnel in Group VII is 26
percent. This is derived by applying Equation 5.1 to the personnel distribution and
marginal tax rates for Group VII. The values are shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5 5 Weighted Average Marginal Tax Rate for Group VII
Percentage Marginal Married Marginal Married Marginal Weighted
Single Tax Rate One Income Tax Rate Two Incomes Tax Rate Average
39.4% 28% 27.9% 21.5% 32.7% 28% 26%
g. Income Group VIII
The vast majority of personnel earning more than $55,000 annually face a
28-percent marginal tax rate. Single personnel at the bottom of Income Group VIII are
unlikely to have enough deductions from total income to bring their taxable income under
93
$24,650. Married personnel with wage-earning spouses face a similar predicament. Even
married personnel with one income would require a mortgage interest deduction, several
children, and an aggressive accountant to qualify for the 15 percent tax rate. Certainly a
few service members whose earnings are at the bottom of Group VIII may be in the 15-
percent tax bracket, but there cannot be many. Some of the most senior officers earn
enough to face a 3 1 -percent marginal tax rate, but these individuals comprise a very small
portion of the active duty force. Since most service members in Group VIII are in the 28-
percent tax bracket, and the small portion of personnel in the 15-percent bracket are
roughly offset by a small portion of personnel in the 31 -percent bracket, the researcher
concludes that Group VIII personnel face a 28-percent marginal tax rate.
7. Income-Tax Revenue Loss
Column eight shows the income tax revenue loss per income group. The federal
government loses income tax revenue on ERA contributions because it foregoes collecting
taxes until the funds are withdrawn from the account. The cost to the government, the
taxes they don't collect, is the product of the contribution and the ERA owner's marginal
tax rate. For example, when a person in the 28-percent tax bracket contributes $2,000 to
an IRA, the federal treasury receives $560 less than it would have without the contribution
deduction. The expected value of the total revenue loss per income group is computed by
multiplying the total contributions per group by the average marginal tax rate of that
group. According to the estimate, the total income tax revenue loss due service member
contributions to IRAs is $56.7 million.
8. The Adjustment Factor
Only a portion of the $56.7 million revenue loss results from changing current
rules to allow all service members to deduct their ERA contributions regardless of income.
Since some of this loss occurs under current regulations, the true cost of the proposal is
only the amount by which it exceeds the existing cost. Two factors reduce the cost of the
proposal: contributions that are currently deductible under existing rules and
94
contributions that would remain nondeductible after the rule change because the service
member's spouse is covered by an employer-sponsored retirement plan.
Any service member in the 1 5 percent tax bracket is currently eligible to deduct his
IRA contribution because his income is below the phase-out levels described in Chapter
III.
18 Personnel whose taxable income exceeds the upper limit of the 15 percent bracket
by $10,000 or less can make partially deductible contributions, but for the sake of
simplicity, the estimate ignores them. Doing so will overstate the cost of the proposal by
attributing to it existing revenue losses.
For each income group the percentage of the revenue loss (L) that is attributable
to the proposal is:
L = S + M + T-P (5.2)
Where:
S = percentage of total personnel in the income group who are unmarried personnel
with a 28-percent marginal tax rate
M = percentage of total personnel in the income group who one-earner married
personnel with a 28-percent marginal tax rate
T = percentage of total personnel in the income group who two-earner married
personnel with a 28-percent marginal tax rate
P = percentage of total personnel in the income group who two-earner married
personnel with a 28-percent marginal tax rate whose spouse is covered by an
employer-sponsored retirement plan
Applying Equation 5.2 to the personnel distribution in each income group
generates the revenue loss adjustment factor for that group. The results are shown in
Table 5.6. The adjustment factor for Groups I through V are not shown since the
researcher concludes that all personnel in those groups are taxed at the 15 percent
marginal rate, giving S, M, T, P and L values of zero. The adjustment factors derived
below are included in column nine of Table 5.1.
18 Actually, the tax brackets do not precisely correspond to the deduction phase-out levels. For unmarried
taxpayers, the first $350 of income taxed at 28 percent can be contributed to IRAs on a deductible basis.
For married taxpayers, the last $1,200 of income taxed at 15 percent cannot be contributed on a fully
deductible basis.
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Table 5.6 Revenue Loss Adjustment Factor
Income Adjustment
Category S M T P Factor (L)
VI 0.0% 0.0% 14.0% 8.0% 6.0%
VII 39.4% 14.0% 33.0% 18.8% 67.6%
VIII 26.6% 33.7% 39.6% 22.6% 77.3%
To determine the value ofS for each group, the percentage of unmarried personnel
is multiplied by the percentage of single personnel who are taxed at the 28-percent
marginal rate. 48.8 percent of personnel in Group VI are single, but none are taxed at 28
percent, so the value of S-VI is zero. For Groups VII and VIII, all single personnel are
taxed at 28 percent so the value of S in those categories is the percentage of personnel
who are unmarried, or 39.4 percent and 26.6 percent respectively.
The percentage of married personnel in each group is the complement of the
percentage of single personnel for that group. Since 54 percent of military spouses are
employed in the civilian workforce, the percentage who are-earner married personnel is 46
percent of the total number of married personnel. The value ofM is the percentage of the
one-earner married personnel who are taxed at the 28-percent marginal rate. None of the
one-earner married personnel in Group VI are taxed at 28 percent, so the value ofM-VJ is
zero. The researcher assumed that half of the one-earner couples in Group VII are taxed
at 28 percent. Since 60 percent of personnel in Group VII are married, and 46 percent
have spouses who do not earn an income, 28 percent of Group VII personnel are one-
earner couples. 50 percent of the 28 percent of the one-earner married personnel in this
group gives M-VJI a value of 14 percent. All of the one-earner married couples in Group
VIII are taxed at 28 percent soM-Vfflis 33.7 percent.
T is the percentage of personnel who are married to an income-earning spouse, (54
percent of the married personnel in the group) who are taxed at the 28-percent marginal
rate For Group VI, the researcher assumed that half of the two-earner married couples
were in the 28-percent tax bracket. Since 28 percent of Group VI personnel are two-
earner married couples, T-VI is 14 percent. All two-earner married couples in Group VII
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and VIII are in the 28 percent tax bracket so the values of T-VII and T-VIII are 33 percent
and 39.6 percent respectively.
P is the percentage of two-earner married personnel with a 28-percent marginal
tax rate who remain ineligible to deduct their contributions because their spouse is covered
by an employer-sponsored retirement plan. According to EBRI, 57 percent of all civilian,
nonagricultural workers are covered by such a plan so the author assumes that 57 percent
of married personnel with working spouses are covered by the spouse's retirement plan.
Thus, P is 57 percent of T. Subtracting P from the sum of S, M, and T gives the
percentage of the revenue loss L in each group that is attributable the proposal to extend
universal IRA deductibility.
9. The Adjusted Revenue Loss
The final step in the estimating procedure is to multiply the percentage of the
income tax revenue loss in each income group that can be assigned to the proposal by the
total revenue loss for the group (column eight.) This yields the adjusted revenue loss for
each income group, the sum of which is the estimate of the income-tax-revenue loss
caused by allowing all military personnel to deduct their IRA contributions from taxable
income regardless of their income level. The researcher estimates that this proposal would
cost the U.S. Treasury $30 million annually.
C. A PERSPECTIVE ON THE ANNUAL COSTS OF THE PROPOSAL
The Internal Revenue Code treats all service members as if they have an ERISA-
compliant retirement plan. However, military retirement does not provide the same
vesting and coverage protections afforded civilian workers with qualified plans. Even
though most service members never qualify for military retirement benefits, they are
denied the opportunity for tax-deferred retirement savings available to most other citizens.
The author estimates that the federal government could alleviate this inequity by foregoing
$30 million in annual income tax revenues.
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Comparing this revenue loss to other federal expenditures puts the cost of the
proposal in perspective. The cost of the proposal is less than l/500th of one percent of
the total $1.6 trillion federal budget. It is just over l/100th of one percent of the $244
billion Defense budget. And it is slightly more than 4/1 00th of one percent of the $70
billion Military Personnel appropriation.
Keep in mind that the proposal does not require the federal government to give
$30 million dollars to service members. On the contrary, it requires the government only
to allow those service members who contribute to IRAs to keep more of what they earn.
D. THE LONG TERM COSTS OF IRAS
The preceding estimate of the annual costs of IRA deductibility overstates the
impact of the proposal on government debt, national saving, and tax revenues over the
long term. Acquiring a more complete estimate of the total costs of IRAs requires an
examination of two revenue effects of IRAs that occur after the years a contribution is
made.
Although it delays collection of income taxes on money contributed to IRAs in the
year in which the money was earned, the government ultimately collects taxes on a much
larger stock of capital. Each dollar that goes into an ERA eventually comes out, and when
it does the government collects taxes. In the interim, the ERA has increased the tax base
because the contributions accrued dividends, interest, and capital gains, which are also
taxed when they are withdrawn. What's more, the gains on ERA assets are larger than the
gains on identical savings vehicles held in taxable accounts, because ERA assets compound
on a pre-tax basis. Thus, the pool of capital in an IRA, on which the government
ultimately collects taxes, is larger than the pool of capital that would accrue to the same
amount of saving held in a taxable account.
Since the government delays tax collection on contributions now to collect taxes
on contributions plus accumulated gains later, tax revenues later are larger than they
would have been without the ERA, assuming that the contributor's marginal tax rate in
98
retirement is at least as high as it was during his preretirement years and that the rate of
return on ERA assets is positive. If the marginal tax rate is lower during retirement than in
preretirement, the value of tax revenues may still be higher under ERAs, but it may not be.
It will depend on the rate of return on ERA assets and the difference in the contributor's
preretirement and retirement marginal tax rates. A sufficiently large rate of return offsets
the reduction in the marginal tax rate.
Of course, a tax revenue gain in the future may mean a present value tax revenue
loss. Because a dollar in tax revenues now is worth more than a dollar in tax revenues 30
years from now, the government may lose money by delaying tax collection on ERA
contributions. Whether there is a gain or loss in present value depends on the discount
rate (or the interest rate on government debt) relative to the rate of return on ERA assets.
Since it is plausible to assume that the rate of return on ERA assets will exceed the cost of
capital to the federal government, the net present value of ERAs will be positive. Again, if
the preretirement marginal tax rate is higher than the retirement period's marginal tax rate,
the increase in the rate of return might not be enough to offset the revenue loss from the
lower retirement tax rate and the net present value of the program may be negative. The
point is that whether tax revenues will rise in retirement when ERA assets are withdrawn,
and whether there is net gain or loss in nominal value or present value, the tax revenues
ultimately collected will reduce, if not outweigh, the loss of tax revenues in the year of the
contribution.
Ignoring the increase in tax revenues during retirement is only one of the ways
traditional analysis overestimates the loss of tax revenues from ERAs. Martin Feldstein
(1995) points out that ERA saving increases the capital stock available to corporations for
investment. Returns on this increased capital expand corporate revenue, which in turn
swells corporate 19 income tax revenues. Feldstein summarizes the effect of increased
corporate tax revenues stemming from IRA savings.
19 By "corporate" Feldstein refers to a wide range of businesses since even nonincorporated businesses
pay income taxes. For the sake of simplifying the discussion, Feldstein uses the term "corporate" to
describe the larger group of business enterprises.
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First, the estimated loss of tax revenue caused by the introduction of an
IRA plan is reduced substantially by the extra corporate tax revenue during
the first five years after its enactment. With plausible parameter values, the
corporate tax revenue offsets about one-third of the decline in personal tax
revenue during the first five years and about two-thirds of the decline in ten
years. Second over a longer time period the IRA program actually
increases total tax revenue and does so by so much that the present value
of changes in annual tax revenues is positive. This implies that the national
debt is eventually permanently lower than it would have been without the
IRA program. Although each individual eventually withdraws all that he
has accumulated in the IRA, the national capital stock is therefore
permanently higher because the increased government receipts permanently
reduce the national debt. (Feldstein, p. 478.)
Five key parameters determine the effect of IRAs on tax revenues when the change
in corporate tax receipts is included in the analysis: the personal tax rates, the corporate
tax rates, the portion ofIRA contributions that are diverted from other savings, the rate of
return on physical capital and the rate of return on government debt (Feldstein.)
Feldstein demonstrates that when the impact of corporate income tax revenues is
included in the calculation, the net effect of IRAs on total tax revenue in a given year (Tt)
of the preretirement period is:
Tt = -0 t[C, - Rt + (1 -x)rBt] + x(A t - Bt)r (5.3)
Where
8 t = the personal marginal tax rate in year t
Ct = the IRA contribution in year /
R t — funds withdrawn from the IRA in year t
x = the corporate marginal tax rate in year /
r = the rate of return on additions to corporate capital stock
Bt - the total capital stock diverted from existing saving at the beginning of year t
A
x
= the value of the IRA account at the start of year /
Additionally:
Bt = [l+(l-6 t)(l -i)r]Bt, +XQ - W, (5.4)
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Where
X = the percentage ofIRA saving that is diverted from existing saving
Wt = the withdrawals from existing savings that would have been made in year t
In Equation 5.3, the first term describes the personal income tax loss each year,
while the second describes the increase in corporate income tax revenues resulting from
the increased capital stock. Feldstein points out that even though the change in personal
income tax revenues is negative each year, the corporate income tax effect is positive in
the first year and grows in importance each year until it is eventually larger than the
personal income tax revenue loss. Since ERA assets earn a higher rate of return [(l-x)r]
than taxable saving vehicles [(l-x)(l-0)r]2° the corporate tax effect grows in relative
importance and will eventually dominate the loss in personal-income-tax revenues if the
preretirement period lasts long enough. If this is the case, the total annual revenue effect
of ERAs during the preretirement years is positive, meaning ERAs pay for themselves
before the owner begins withdrawing the assets from the account. Feldstein points out
that even if the entire ERA contribution is transferred from existing savings, the net effect
is still positive because the contributor's wealth is larger due to the higher rate of return
on capital.
There is nothing magical about ERAs that increase corporate income tax revenues.
Any saving that increases the nation's stock of capital will increase corporate investment,
the returns on which increase corporate income tax revenues. Thus the cost analysis of
any proposal to encourage saving (or reduce the disincentive to save) should consider the
positive effect on capital investment and corporate tax revenues. A unique feature of
ERAs that enables them to increase savings relative to traditional saving vehicles is the fact
that they compound gross of personal income taxes. Even if all ERA contributions come
from existing saving, ceteris parabus, ERAs still increase savings because assets do not
20 Feldstein uses this notation for the rate of return to point out that traditional saving vehicles compound
net of both personal and corporate income taxes (t and 8) while IRAs compound net of corporate taxes
only.
101
have to be withdrawn from the account (or diverted from other sources) each year to pay
taxes on interest, dividends, or realized capital gains.
Martin Feldstein illustrates the long-term effects of IRAs on government debt
using different combinations of values of the parameters mentioned earlier. In one
variation he describes a person who contributes to an IRA for 20 years, beginning at age
45. This person then withdraws the funds in equal annual amounts until age 79. Feldstein
assumes that the personal-income-tax-revenue losses are financed with increased
government debt. The individual in the example contributes $2,000 a year, and 20 percent
of the contribution is diverted from other savings. The rate of return on capital is ten
percent, the corporate tax rate is 34 percent, and the contributor's marginal tax rate is 25
percent during both preretirement and retirement. The real interest rate on government
debt is two percent. Using these values, the reduction in personal income tax revenues
caused by the ERA increases government debt by $14,300 at the time the individual retires.
When the individual retires and begins withdrawing his ERA assets, the change in income
tax revenue becomes positive so that by the time the contributions and gains in the ERA
have been completely withdrawn at age 79, the government debt is $14,929 lower than it
would have been without the ERA program. These figures do not take into account the
increase in corporate income tax revenues.
Feldstein demonstrates that including the positive revenue effect of the increased
corporate income tax receipts has a dramatic effect on the total revenue. Using the same
scenario, the gain in corporate income taxes offsets more than half the loss in personal
income tax after four years (by the time the contributor reaches age 49.) In the ninth year,
the corporate tax revenue offsets the entire loss in personal income tax, and from that
point on, the ERA has a net positive effect on total tax revenues. By the fourteenth year,
the accumulated gains from increased corporate tax revenues completely offset the
preceding net losses so that government debt is permanently lower than when the
contributor began the ERA. When the individual retires at 65, government debt has been
reduced by $6,397, compared to the prediction of a $14,300 increase in debt predicted
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when corporate tax revenue increases are not included. By the time the individual expends
all ERA funds at age 79, government debt is $64,906 lower than it would have been
without the IRA. (Feldstein, 1995.)
The assumptions on which the preceding example was based may be optimistic, so
Feldstein uses several different combinations of parameter values in his model and
determines that even under more pessimistic assumptions, the corporate tax revenue effect
increases the present value of total tax revenues. For example, if the corporate marginal
tax rate is only 17 percent, the individual's marginal tax rate drops from 25 percent during
the contribution years to 1 5 percent during retirement, and half of the IRA contribution is
funded by diverting other saving21 , the net effect on government debt is still positive by
the time the contributor withdraws all the funds from the IRA. Under this scenario, the
gain in corporate tax revenues exceeds half the reduction in personal tax revenues by the
14th year of contribution, and completely offsets the personal income tax loss by the 21st
year. The net government debt declines in the 26th year, and by the time the contributor
withdraws all the funds at age 79, government debt is $19,063 lower than it would have
been without the IRA.
Thus, while the ERA reduces personal income tax revenues in every
preretirement year, the increase in corporate income tax receipts offsets the
personal income tax losses and generally makes the net tax effect positive
during the preretirement period. The impact of the government debt,
including the accumulated interest effects, is therefore positive long before
it would be if only the personal tax revenue were affected. Over the entire
period of the ERA, the present value of the personal income tax changes is
positive for most but not all of the parametric variations considered, but the
positive contribution of the increased corporate income tax revenue makes
the combined present value of all tax changes positive in every parametric
case examined. The overall effect is therefore to have the national capital
stock higher than it would be without the ERA program." (Feldstein, p.
487)
21 According to the discussion in Chapter IV, this estimate of the percentage of diverted funds is more
plausible. If 26 percent of IRA contributions is new saving and 35 percent comes from the reduction in
taxes, 39 percent must come from diverting money from other savings.
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And since government debt is reduced by the IRA, the national capital stock is
permanently higher, even after the IRA owner has withdrawn all the contributions and
accumulated gains.
Presenting Martin Feldstein's argument here illustrates that a simple calculation of
annual personal income tax revenue loss from IRA contributions significantly overstates
actual costs by failing to take into account the positive effect on tax revenues of the
withdrawal of a larger pool of funds, and by failing to include increased corporate tax
revenues in the equation. At what point the net revenue effect becomes positive, and at
what point net government debt declines, depends on the values chosen for the relevant
parameters. It is impossible to determine whether IRA contributions by military personnel
would reduce government debt during their active-duty service because the present value
would depend on their personal marginal tax rate and the number of years they contributed
to IRAs during their active duty service. For personnel who begin contributing early in
their career, the net revenue effect will most likely be positive. In the case of personnel
who wait until later in their career to begin contributions, the growing effect of increasing
corporate tax revenues may not have time to offset the higher loss in personal income tax
revenues incurred early in the contribution period. Thus, for personnel who separate from
the military less than 1 5 years22 after they begin contributing to IRAs, the net effect during
their period of active duty service will be an increase in government debt. However, the
ultimate effect will be a reduction in government debt, even though it will not occur until
after the service member leaves the military.
Regardless of when the net revenue effect of IRAs becomes positive, and when
government debt declines, the cost of IRAs is much less than an examination of the annual
loss in personal income tax revenues alone would lead one to believe. The author's
estimate of a $30 million loss in annual personal income tax revenue overstates the actual
annual cost because it does not include the corporate tax revenue effect. Since most
22 In the twelve cases (or variations of parameter values) presented in Feldstein's argument, government
debt declined between 15 and 26 years after the contributor began his IRA.
104
service members will not contribute to IRAs for 1 5 to 26 years before they separate, it is
unlikely that the net effect of IRA participation by active duty service members will be
positive if the examination of revenue is restricted to the active-duty period. It will be
significantly less than an estimate made by multiplying the annual personal income tax
revenue loss by the number of years of IRA contributions while on active duty. And if the
net effect is examined over the service member's lifetime, including the period after
separation from active duty, IRAs ultimately reduce national debt.
Since it is just a matter of time before an individual's ERA reduces government
debt, the sooner service members start contributing, the better. Even though there is an
initial reduction in total annual tax revenues, the federal government will hasten the
eventual reduction in debt by encouraging (or at least removing the disincentive to) ERA
contributions by active duty personnel.
E. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, the author demonstrated that the cost to the federal
government in personal income tax revenue lost from allowing service members to deduct
their ERA contributions from taxable income, regardless of their income level, is $30
million dollars annually. Considered in isolation, the cost of the proposal is not
prohibitive, and should not be used as a reason to deny service members the same
opportunity for tax-deferred retirement savings available to other citizens who do not have
an ERISA-compliant retirement plan. When the positive effect of increased corporate
income tax revenues is considered, the argument for contribution deductibility becomes
even stronger. Not only is the cost of the proposal lower than it appears from estimating
the personal income tax losses during the contribution period, but the proposal may even




This thesis presented both equity and economic arguments that support the
proposal to allow all military personnel to deduct their ERA contributions regardless of
income.
Military retirement generously benefits the 17 percent of service members who
meet the 20 years-of-service eligibility and vesting requirement, by providing an immediate
annuity of 40 to 75 percent of basic pay after separation. These generous benefits come at
the expense of the larger majority of personnel who never reach 20 years of service, and
thus receive no retirement benefit. Critics from diverse backgrounds have faulted the
system, in which a person who serves for 1 9 years can be terminated and receive none of
the retirement benefits that he has been accruing, for being unfair to the majority of service
members.
For decades, Congress, the Department of Defense, and several blue-ribbon
commissions have examined, considered, and debated a variety of proposals designed to
make the military retirement system more equitable to all service members. A lack of
consensus, combined with bureaucratic and legislative inertia, stymied efforts for reform.
In the last 50 years, only marginal changes designed to cut costs have been implemented.
The Defense Department itself is loathe to embrace proposals for change for two
reasons. First, the retirement system dramatically affects force structure, influencing the
distribution of personnel by rank and experience within the armed forces. Any
restructuring of military retirement will affect accession, effort motivation, ability sorting,
and retention, dramatically reshaping the force in the process. There are proposals to
reform the retirement system as part of a comprehensive military compensation overhaul,
but they have not attracted support from either DoD or Congress.
Second, the Defense Department resists any effort at retirement system reform for
fear of "putting retirement on the table." DoD is concerned, with good reason in this era
of declining Defense budgets, Congress would use an opportunity to change the system as
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a way to carve more budget savings out of military retirement without improving the
system's structure, performance or equity. DoD doesn't want to be the one to initiate a
reform process that might result in a system that is even worse.
Military personnel who separate voluntarily or involuntarily at any point prior to
20 years of service will not receive any of the retirement benefit they have allegedly
accrued during their service. Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 to prevent this kind of practice in the private sector. By lowering mandatory
vesting dates to five years, expanding coverage requirements, and mandating funding
levels, Congress improved worker's mobility by allowing employees to retain accrued
retirement benefits if they change jobs. The law also protected employees from benefit
loss caused by the collapse of underfunded plans and made it difficult for employers to
reduce the costs of their retirement system by terminating employees before they reach
retirement eligibility.
Private plans that comply with ERISA's provisions qualify for tax-favored
treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. Employers who place assets in a qualified
plan they have established for the benefit of their workers can deduct their contributions to
the plan from business earnings, reducing their tax liability. Employees do not have to pay
taxes on the employer's contributions, until they begin to receive them as benefits during
retirement. Thus, qualified plans allow both employers and employees to defer taxes on
retirement plan's assets for a period of time. For the same cost, employers can provide
additional aftertax compensation to employees by providing some pay in retirement
benefits. Employees enjoy savings that appreciate at a higher effective rate of return
because they compound gross of personal income taxes.
Because employees with qualified employer-sponsored retirement plans have tax-
deferred retirement saving through their plan, the Internal Revenue Code restricts their
access to another form of tax-deferred retirement saving: the Individual Retirement
Account. IRAs were also established in ERISA to provide similar tax-favored saving to
workers who don't have an employer-sponsored pension plan. Of course, ERAs do not
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provide identical benefits, because the contribution limit for them is much lower than for
employer-sponsored plans. Workers without a workplace retirement plan may deduct
their contributions to IRAs, but workers who are covered by a qualified plan cannot
deduct their contributions unless they are in the lowest marginal tax bracket. Covered
workers may still contribute and enjoy tax-deferred compounding of gains on ERA
investments, but since they can already shield some income from taxes under their
employer's ERISA-compliant plan, the ERC prevents them from doing so again through an
ERA
Ironically, military personnel are treated as if their retirement plan complies with
ERISA, when in fact it deviates markedly from the minimum standards. Thus, a service
member who separates prior to 20 years of service receives no retirement benefits from
the military, but has been denied the opportunity to deduct his IRA contributions for much
of his military career.
Bringing military retirement into frill compliance with ERISA is one way to
mitigate the general inequity of the existing system and eliminate the disparity of treatment
and protection between military and civilian-sector retirement plans. Since the odds are
against any such structural reform for the military-retirement system, the Internal Revenue
Service should stop treating military personnel as if their retirement plan complies with
ERISA standards, and allow all service members to deduct their contributions from
taxable income as a matter of simple fairness and consistency.
Although the exact magnitude of the impact of ERAs on saving behavior is subject
to debate, the author is convinced that they increase private saving. High marginal tax
rates, inflation, and the taxation of nominal versus real gains discourage saving. ERAs
increase saving by reducing the penalties to saving. Additionally, the immediate reward of
a tax deduction encourages many people to participate in ERAs. Thus, allowing all service
members to deduct their ERA contributions would increase participation in the armed
forces and increase private savings in the process. The national capital stock would be
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higher, and service members, particularly those who separate from the military prior to 20
years of service, would be better prepared financially for retirement.
The cost of this proposal is not prohibitive. Annual personal income tax revenue
losses of $30 million annually would cause barely a ripple in the $1.6 trillion federal
budget. Much of the annual cost is offset since income tax revenue increases when the
contributions and gains are withdrawn from the account and rising capital stock increases
corporate earnings and thus corporate income taxes. While the net tax revenue effect may
not be positive during the service member's time in the military, during their lifetime IRAs
will increase rather than decrease total tax revenues for the government. Since the size of
the revenue gain is directly related to the length of the preretirement period, encouraging
early participation in IRAs by reducing the disincentive to save will reduce government
debt and increase national saving.
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APPENDIX. CHANGES TO IRAs FOR 1998
While the author was researching and writing this thesis, Congress passed the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1 997 which modified the rules governing ERA participation and
eligibility. One set of changes modified the structure of the existing ERA, and another set
created a new type of ERA.
Changes to the existing ERA take effect in 1998. The new law increases the
income phase-out range for workers with an employer-sponsored retirement plan. The
increase will occur in steps from 1998 to 2007. By 2005, the adjusted gross income
(AGI) phase-out range for unmarried filers will increase to $50,000 to $60,000, and by
2007 the AGI phase-out range for married taxpayers increases to $80,000 to $100,000.
Below these ranges, taxpayers may make fully deductible contributions. Taxpayers with
AGIs within the range can make partially-deductible contributions, and taxpayers above
the AGI range can make nondeductible contributions only. This change will reduce the
personal income tax revenue loss caused by the proposal to allow all service members to
deduct their ERAs, regardless of income. As the phase-out range increases, the number of
service members who are ineligible for deductible contributions decreases, thus reducing
the cost of allowing the remaining ineligible service members to deduct their contributions.
Eventually though, nominal wage growth will raise the income of more service members
above the increased phase-out ranges and fewer service members will be eligible to deduct
their contributions without the adoption of the proposal.
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The change to the contribution-deductibility limit strengthens the argument for the
proposal. The equity argument for extending universal IRA deductibility is unaffected, but
the cost of the proposal is reduced because fewer people will be affected by it. The higher
AGI limits mean fewer new contributors will deduct their contributions under the
proposal, and thus the differential personal income tax revenue loss will be smaller.
In addition to raising the AGI limits for the current IRA, Congress added a new
type of account, called the Roth IRA, which has the following features:
• Contributions are nondeductible, but earnings accrue tax free, and no taxes are
paid on gains at withdrawal. There is no penalty on withdrawals prior to age
59 1/2 if the contributions remain in the account for five years and the money is
used for college expenses or a first-time home purchase (up to $10,000).
• The total IRA contribution limit remains $2,000. Taxpayers can have both a
conventional ERA and a Roth IRA, but the combined contributions to both
cannot exceed $2,000 in any year.
• Eligibility phases out between $95,000 and $1 10,000 for unmarried taxpayers
and between $150,000 and $160,000 for married filers.
• Unlike the current IRA, there is no requirement to begin withdrawing assets
from the account after age 10Vz.
• Amounts equal to the nondeductible contributions can be withdrawn at any
time without penalty.
• Balances in existing ERAs can be transferred to a Roth ERA ifAGI is below
$100,000. Taxes are due on any gains or deductible contributions, but if the
transfer is made prior to January 1, 1999, the tax burden can be spread out
over four years.
Roth ERAs also have no effect on the equity argument, but they would also reduce
the cost of the proposal. To the extent that some service members select Roth ERAs,
fewer personnel will make deductible contributions to conventional ERAs, thus reducing
the personal income tax revenue loss. The Roth ERA may raise current tax revenues and
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reduce total tax revenues relative to traditional ERAs, but this Appendix will not explore
that possibility.
Additionally, Congress created a tax-deferred saving account for education
expenses which has been labeled an "Education IRA," but this is a misnomer, since the
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